In the case of Ufford and Dykes, a verdict was rendered February 27, 1855; the 23d of the same month, and the same year, Hewitson's deposition is taken, de bene esse, at Galveston, to prove up the power of attorney. The order of transfer had then been made to remove the Lapsley cases from Austin to New Orleans. The power to Williams was common to both suits. It had been managed to get it into the Ufford and Dykes case without difficulty, through the favor of Judge Watrous, and the evident collusion of counsel. In the Lapsley cases, however, an attempt is made to prove it up by Hewitson's deposition. Why, I ask, was this done? Why was the discrimination in relation to the proof of the power made between the two suits, unless for the palpable reason that it was considered that the power was not in a position to pass the review of the tribunal at New Orleans? Thus again is betrayed the ill-concealed concern of the parties in relation to this power of attorney.
The deposition of Hewitson appears to have been taken at Galveston. It is to be observed that the Lapsley cases, in which it was intended to be used, were then in transitu, in obedience to the order of transfer, and that the transcript was in the pocket of Robert Hughes at Galveston. The deposition was taken before Archibald Hughes, a son of Robert Hughes, an agent of Lapsley, Watrous, and others, in their land transactions, deputy marshal, then, or formerly, deputy clerk, and United States Commissioner in Judge Watrous' court. Thus, before this creature of the court, without notice to the counsel of Spencer, then in Galveston, and selecting the time when the suits were in tranisitu, it was managed to take this deposition of a confederate in the land transactions both of court and counsel.
The introduction of this deposition was made with an adroitness and secrecy characteristic of the parties who managed it. They were governed by constant policy and secrecy, that seem to have regulated all their movements. In the Lapsley suit, as in the Phalen suit at New Orleans, they showed their appreciation of the maxims of the policy of Reynolds, who advised that the cause should "go off quietly"; that "the least possible notoriety should attend it," etc.
Thus was the deposition of the confederate Hewitson, on which it was sought to rob the honest settlers of their land and homes, taken after the transcript had been ordered to be transmitted to New Orleans, taken without notice to the opposite parties, and taken surreptitiously before a creature of the court, and a man in intimate relation with those whose interest it was to betray and defeat the settlers who claimed the land. Remarkable coincidence — this testimony of Hewitson. in support of the power of attorney, is taken at Galveston during the trial of the Ufford vs. Dykes case, and perhaps on the very day when Hughes so magnanimously furnished Hale with a copy, and stipulated that no exceptions should be taken.
In my opening remarks I alluded to "the deep secrecy" which surrounded, as far as possible, the movements of the conspiracy, a sketch of which I have attempted to give from the results of long investigation, and by the lights of some newly discovered evidence on the subject. I have pointed out, in the progress of the narrative, instances of the secrecy and cunning of the management of these parties. Every means were taken to conceal their steps, and every opportunity was seized to take the opposite parties at advantage.
