And, in this connection, it will te borne in mind that Judge Watrous not alone received one-fourth part of the purchased land at the trifling consideration named, but also, on a credit of five years, and to this day, after a lapse of eight years, has not paid, or been required to pay, one cent.
Moreover, there is another most important circumstance. I have stated that the grant in the Hancock and McKinney case and the La Vega grant were identical. The position of Samuel M. Williams was the same in both grants. He had sold the Santiago del Valle grant (which was involved in the Hancock and McKinney case), as the agent of Santiago del Valle, in the same manner as he had sold the La Vega grant as the agent of La Vega. Judge Watrous was also interested in the Santiago del Valle grant to the extent of some four or five thousand acres of land. He, the judge, was represented by Robert Hughes, who argued the case before the Supreme Court of Texas. Now, it appears that, in the Hancock and McKinney case, as in the Lapsley cases, there was no power of attorney from Santiago del Valle to Williams.
In the case of Hancock vs. McKinney, "it was admitted that Williams had authority to act for Del Valle." This is reported from the case — 7 Texas Reports. An opportunity to explain this singular admission was offered Hughes, the counsel of Judge Watrous, on his examination as a witness before the House committee. But what does he say?
"Question. Was the power of attorney from Santiago del Valle, authorizing Williams to sell, in the Hancock and McKinney case?
"Answer. I do not know. It is a long time since I saw that record."
Now, is it to be supposed that this active counsel in the case where his client and patron, Judge Watrous, was interested to the amount of four or five thousand acres of the most valuable land (situated immediately opposite to the seat of government), would have failed to recollect the existence of this all-important link in the chain of title? Thus, as in the case of Ufford and Dykes, so in the case of Hancock vs. McKinney, it is managed to obtain the admission, and to avoid all question as to the authority of Williams to sell the land.
So, it appears, that of the parties. Judge Watrous and his counsel, Robert Hughes, at least, went into the La Vega land speculation, their attention directed, especially directed, to the power of attorney from La Vega to Williams, which they had to look to as the principal link of title.
The investigation touching the official conduct of Judge Watrous, which was had in the Thirty-fourth Congress, was made in the most deliberate, painstaking, and thorough manner. Distinct votes were taken at different stages of the proceedings. Nearly the whole available time of the session was devoted to the examination of the records offered in support of the charges, which records in fact composed the entire evidence in the cases.
With respect to the charges assigned by Spencer, the committee found a verdict against the judge, and proclaimed that "he had given just cause ol alarm to the citizens of Texas for the safety of private rights and property, and of their public domain, and had debarred them from the rights of an impartial trial in the federal courts of their own district."
This judgment was followed up, and in its conclusions enforced by a
