of the judges on a rule nisi for a mandamus, but took the judge's return as absolutely true in relation to the facts." I ask honorable Senators to pause here. I beg them to consider to what this question of appeal from Judge Watrous' court has reduced itself. I ask, has Judge Watrous proved himself the man of truth and honor, that his word should not be permitted to be questioned? Is he the man whose statement should not be gainsaid? Is he the man to be continued in a position where his statements are to govern and override all contradiction? Is he the man to remain on the bench?
It has been shown now what steps were taken by Judge Watrous and his court officers to baffle, and finally defeat, the appeal of Mussina.
Thus was the right of appeal, a right so absolutely recognized as essential to the interests of justice, and so important with reference to public policy, denied the petitioner. Such, indeed, was a fitting conclusion to the series of acts of collusion, tyranny, and oppression which had signalized the action of the judge in the celebrated Cavazos case.
As to the final act of collusion on the part of Judge Watrous and his confederates in preventing Mussina's appeal, the judgment of the committee in the Thirty-fourth Congress is so strong and clear, that if I could afford the time, I might comment at length upon the deliberate and atrocious circumstances that mark this last act in the Cavazos case.
But even apart from this, there appear additional reasons why an appeal was not taken in the Cavazos case, even if it had been possible; or why an attempt was not made at an earlier day, despite of the machinations to prevent it. There were reasons to esteem the record as partial, collusive, and false; and a party might well hesitate to risk his case upon such a record. He might well fear the effect of a made-up record ; and one made up, too, as the testimony would show, under the eye of William G. Hale, the chief actor in the scenes we have described.
But I conceive a special and particular reason to prevent a party from risking his rights on such a record as that in the Cavazos case. I allude here to one of the most open and barefaced acts of collusion possible to be imagined, having been countenanced by the judge, and put falsely upon the record, so as to operate to the particular prejudice and detriment of Mussina. This circumstance alone will furnish an ample explanation of Mr. Mussina's much-accused delay in taking an appeal.
It appears that by collusion, and in defiance of law and justice, Robert H. Hord was called by the complainants, and made a witness for them, on the trial of the Cavazos case. Thereupon, having been sworn on his voir dire to testify as to his interest, the solicitor of Jacob Mussina, one of the defendants, put the following questions to him:
"Have you, or have you not, any understanding or agreement with the complainants, or either of them, or their agent or solicitors, in relation to the determination of this cause, or of any of the matters involved therein, adverse to any interest or right claimed by Jacob Mussina in any property or rights involved in this suit? Are you, or not, interested in any such understanding or agreement?"
This question Mr. Hord refused to answer, and, thereupon, the court decided "that the question need not be answered."
