Gen. Houston displayed itself every day after he took the command of the army at Gonzales. In the afternoon of the 20th Col. Sherman was allowed to go out with the cavalry, and reconnoitre the enemy's position and forces, the artillery and infantry battalion remaining concealed behind an island of timber, to be in readiness to meet and check the advances of the enemy if Sherman's command should be attacked. Hardly had the reconnoitering party disappeared before the sound of firing was heard in their direction. Gen. Houston mounted his horse and rode to the scene of action, and met the cavalry coming in. A general engagement had not, fortunately, been brought on, but one soldier had been killed, and another wounded. The truth of history demands that the state ment of Gen. H. S. Foote (vol. ii., p. 301) should be placed on record, confirmed by the endorsement of Gen. Houston himself. Gen. Foote's statement is that the last action of the 20th " was a bold and well-conceived ruse to delude the commander-in-chief into a conflict in spite of the monitions of his cooler judgment."
Houston was satisfied that his plan of giving battle the next day would succeed, and he was reluctant to peril unnecessarily the life of a single man. Retiring to their camp at the close of the 20th, the Texan army refreshed themselves for the first time in two days. The position of the Mexican army maintained till the charge made upon it the next day, may be learned from Gen. Houston's official report. "The enemy in the meantime extended the right flank of their infantry, so as to occupy the extreme point of a skirt of timber on the bank of the San Jacinto, and secured their left by a fortification about five feet high, constructed of packs and baggage, leaving an opening in the centre of their breastwork, in which their artillery was placed—the cavalry upon the left wing."
