Code] retaliation claims is identical.”). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must “demonstrate that: (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) an adverse employment action occurred; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Gorman, 753 F.3d at 170 (quoting Royal v. CCC & R Tres Arboles, L.L.C., 736 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 2013)). “Adverse employment action” is a materially adverse action that “might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the employment action. See Gorman, 753 F.3d at 171.
The district court concluded that Lindsley failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because she could not demonstrate an adverse employment action. We agree.
Lindsley argues that “material parts of [her] job duties were removed from her.” But the only example she provides is when Omni Corpus Christi’s general manager, Steve Keenan, emailed Lindsley’s team giving them a deadline for a menu promotion without allowing Lindsley to speak to her team directly. This one instance does not amount to a material change in job duties—much less one likely to dissuade a reasonable worker from making a charge of discrimination—under governing precedent. As the Supreme Court has made clear, “petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners will not create such deterrence.” Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68.
Lindsley also says that, after she filed her charge, Keenan “became increasingly hostile,” including on one occasion “screaming at her,
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