III.
We begin by addressing Lindsley’s pay discrimination claims. Each of the statutes invoked in this case—Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), the Texas Labor Code, Tex. Lab. Code § 21.051, and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)—prohibits discrimination in employment, including compensation, on the basis of sex. The burden shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), governs these claims. See id. at 802 (Title VII); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Canchola, 121 S.W.3d 735, 739 (Tex. 2003) (Texas law); Siler-Khodr v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. San Antonio, 261 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2001) (Equal Pay Act).
Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff has the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of pay discrimination. 411 U.S. at 802. The standards under each statute for establishing a prima facie case are similar. Under the Equal Pay Act, a plaintiff must show that “she performed work in a position requiring equal skill, effort and responsibility under similar working conditions,” and that she “was paid less than members of the opposite sex.” Jones v. Flagship Int’l, 793 F.2d 714, 722–23 (5th Cir. 1986). Under both Title VII and the Texas Labor Code, a plaintiff must show that she was paid less than members of the opposite sex for “work requiring substantially the same responsibility.” Taylor v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 522 (5th Cir. 2008). See also Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Monarrez, 177 S.W.3d 915, 917–18 (Tex. 2005) (explaining that the Texas Labor Code was meant to “correlate state law with federal law in employment discrimination cases”) (quoting Canchola, 121 S.W.3d at 739).
If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the defendant to put forth a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the pay disparity. See Taylor, 554 F.3d at 522–23; Siler-Khodr, 261 F.3d at 546.
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