the place of its birth; let us hope that the good which these men have done may live after them, and that only the evil will be buried with their bones.
GERMANY AND AUSTRIA.
There is one peculiarity in the situation of Germany to which Englishmen do not as yet, we think, pay quite sufficient attention. It is very doubtful whether the statesmen and soldiers who guide the destinies of the empire — the emperor, Prince Bismarck, Count von Moltke, the Crown Prince, and Prince Frederick Charles — as yet think its military position safe. So sudden and complete were the victories of 1866 and 1870, so utterly were Austria and France prostrated, so perfect seemed the mechanism of the German military machine, that Englishmen scarcely understand how Germans can be anxious, and wonder why they cannot, like Englishmen and Americans, content themselves with the peaceful accumulation of wealth. No power dare attack them, and no power of the military kind ventures even to defy them. There is reason to believe, however, that this is not exactly the view taken by the great German chiefs themselves. They know perfectly well that, powerful as Germany is, she was indebted, both in 1866 and 1870, in some degree to fortune for her marvellous success. In 1866, the best German regiments in the Austrian army never met the Prussians at all, but were occupied with the Italians at Custozza. In 1870, the army of the Second Empire was in a situation unparalleled since the days of Louis XV., — undermanned, badly officered, led by generals who hated one another, and commanded, in the last resort by a man who had no orders to give, and was unable to secure attention to his advice. Nevertheless, that army fought one splendid battle, and but for Marshal Bazaine's self-seeking policy might, even at the eleventh hour, have altered the whole current of affairs. Such circumstances are not likely to repeat themselves, and as Prince Bismarck and Count von Moltke look around, they may see facts which, if interpreted as they would interpret them, may cause them serious disquietude. To the westward lies a military Republic full of wealth and resources, with an army on paper as numerous as the German, and in reality as numerous as any army Germany could move, unless her very existence were in danger, animated by an intense wish to retrieve her prestige, and a fixed determination at some future period to recover Lorraine. To the southward is an empire badly constructed, and essentially weak, but ruled by a most experienced prince, who during war would be absolute, who, for one great battle at least, would dispose of 400,000 men, nearly half of them Germans, and who cannot be believed willing to put up with his expulsion from an empire which in 1868 he acknowledged by his visit to Frankfort that he hoped to rule. To the northward is a peninsula which might under certain circumstances open the gate of Germany to a foe, and to the eastward a gigantic empire, ruled by a man whose successor may not be friendly, who must regard his empire rather than his own feelings, and who could order a quarter of a million of stubborn soldiers to move upon Berlin, a capital which on that side is not a hundred and fifty miles from a nearly defenceless frontier. Germany is hemmed in by first-class armies, and with all her gigantic strength might be overmatched by a coalition of these powers, or even of two of them; and it is no wonder that her rulers and her people, as yet scarcely aware of the greatness of their new position, scarcely exempt from the influences of their own past history, should restlessly watch the faintest indications of the coming of such a combination, or should even brood over plans which would, if successful, render it impossible.
That the best of these plans would be to remain quiet, to grow rich, and to acquire the confidence of Europe, is the conviction of most Englishmen, but it is not necessarily the conviction of men who at heart doubt whether European opinion ever seriously affects the policy of military states. The rulers of Germany may think that France can never be conciliated, that Austria may find it necessary to choose between a great victory or a near decease; that Russia, be her opinion what it might, would obey her czar's command; and that the only security for Germany is to grow till she is in her own strength beyond the reach of attack, even by a coalition. We English think this, and say this, as regards the sea, where we always profess ourselves bound to be ready to meet a combination; and Germany, in this view, is in the po-
