Page:Littell's Living Age - Volume 127.djvu/823

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THE MILITARY FUTURE OF GERMANY.
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"Marthe," said Camille — " my wife — forgive me!"

He was deeply moved; he was conquered.

Eighteen months later there was great excitement in the musical world. An opera by Saintis was brought out at the Opéra Comique, and it proved to be a genuine success. The musicians praised it — the public applauded heartily the charm and grace of the melodies.

"And our musician's theories?"

"His theories!" exclaimed Durand, addressing the circle of friends assembled to talk over the affair between the acts of the first representation — "his theories! he has shown himself wise in keeping them in the background this time; they led him to nothing but failure with his first opera. He owes this evening's success, I can tell you, to an influence which is quite independent of thorough-bass."

"Oh, we know!" exclaimed several young men laughing. "You ought to remind the director to have printed on the play-bills — 'Music by M. Saintis and wife!'"

"You have been her champion from the first, Durand."

"And I do not mean to resign the post. Laugh if you will, but to me the week has no pleasanter evening than Wednesday, when all the old friends and cronies of Saintis are made welcome by his wife; to hear her sing her husband's music is a perfect delight. She is charming. But there goes the signal; it would be a pity to miss the chance of watching her face as the curtain goes up. Au revoir!" and he went off, humming —

On change tour à tour
De folie:
Moi, jusqu'au dernier jour,
Je m'en tiens a l'amour
De ma mie.




From Macmillan's Magazine.

THE MILITARY FUTURE OF GERMANY.

BY COL. CHAS. C. CHESNEY.

Those who would understand the exigencies of Berlin politicians, and the anxieties of Berlin strategists, must avoid the error our press has of late very generally fallen into, of treating the question of the future of Germany as though it were something that has to be discussed exclusively between herself and France. The days are altogether past when the "duel of the nations" could mean nothing else than individual struggle between that which was, and that which now is, the new empire in Europe. All arguments and reflections that ignore the fact that there are other great empires, whose policy must seriously influence the statesmen of Germany, rest on too partial a view of the European situation to be worth earnest discussion. Yet the common belief with ourselves and our neighhours is to speak and write just as though the old dualism of western Europe had been, and would continue to be, the sole part of Continental politics that deserves anxious consideration, or that can affect Continental politicians profoundly. It will be the purpose of these pages to show that such views are altogether too limited; and that the solution of any great international problem of our time must be sought far beyond the limits of the often-repeated struggle between France and Germany.

We may illustrate this first by looking a little closely at the history of the crisis that occurred but three months since; when the utter fallacy of the popular belief that ascribed it solely to German fears of growing French strength and improved French organization, will soon become apparent. It was not without reason, certainly, that when the military advisers in Prussia strove last May to force on the war which only Russian intervention stayed, genuine astonishment was expressed by those in France as well as elsewhere, who knew how utterly unfit she was to cope with her old rival, and how impossible of execution the hopes of early revenge attributed to Frenchmen are. This sentiment has naturally not been lessened by the recent discussions on the exact strength of French armaments. And many persons, reasoning from what lies on the surface only, and assuming with truth that facts obvious to a chance observer of things in France cannot possibly be hid from the watchful observance of Berlin, declare their belief that as Count Moltke could have nothing to fear from the French army, the designs imputed to him in May on authority which is hardly controvertible, could never have actually existed. Now the premisses of this argument are all sound enough. France really has not under arms three-fourths of the peace establishment of her warlike neighbour. It is only within the last month that her war-office has taken the first step towards training even the first instalment of the