tic military empire that has grown up on their eastern border. It remains, therefore, only to inquire briefly how far their means may enable them to compass the end in view with a fair prospect of success. Supposing, in short, that the proposed works were all completed; that the reorganized army which is decreed to man them under the same act that has voted the millions, were raised and ready; and that, finally, a not less important condition, the people of Holland, instead of being as distracted and doubtful of their cause as when the Prussians marched across the frontier under Brunswick, were as united and resolute as their forefathers in their early struggles for liberty: could they enter on the great trial of a war with the German empire with any prospect of closing it short of ruin, or at least complete submission?
To answer this question decidedly could only be done on a correct forecast of the policy of the other nations of Europe. If the hope of the Dutch were by the mere strength of their unrivalled line of defences (unrivalled, because sea and river would aid them as no other Continental works can be aided), to maintain such a contest single-handed for an indefinite time; then they would be altogether self-deceived. German strategy understands how to be patient in season, as well as vigorous when a blow has to be struck. With a fleet probably far superior to the Dutch at sea, and an army of which a mere fraction could safely and continuously hold every acre of Dutch ground up to the "New Water Line" of the defence scheme; it would not be necessary for their commander to do more than use the necessary pressure of an occupation which would be in fact an investment, in order to enforce his terms in time. If the lines were indeed impregnable, or nearly so, they would be left alone; but they would not save the heart of Holland for all that. These are not the days when a campaign breaks up at the end of summer; and a Dutch winter would hardly drive from good quarters in the rich plains of the Waal and Leek such generals and soldiers as bivouacked round Orleans and Le Mans in the severest cold that France has for many years experienced.
If, on the other hand, all that the Dutch desire is to imitate the prudent example set them by neighbouring Belgium guided by Brialmont's skill, and to make of the land within their "New Water Line" a grander and more roomy Antwerp, where the whole national army might for a time be sheltered from a tenfold force of enemies, whilst calmly waiting such succour by sea or land as the political combinations of the time might promise; then indeed the design lately begun may be pronounced far-seeing, wise, and suited to the national purpose: and success may be hoped for it, if proper forethought and care be used, with as much certainty as failure and discredit might have been prophesied by any skilled observer who watched unseen the doubt and discord that pervaded the council-chamber and the camp of the patriots of 1787.
It is not for a moment to be supposed that the Dutch, if threatened by the powerful neighbour who holds the frontier, until now covered largely by Hanover, can do much more than protect themselves against a coup de main. They would doubtless imitate the gallant resistance of the Danes to the invasion of Slesvik, and we trust less ineffectually. But it cannot be too loudly proclaimed that the independence of the Netherlands is a cardinal point in the political system of Europe, and one which we regard of absolutely vital importance to ourselves. The two most formidable crises in modern history occurred whilst the Low Countries were under the dominion of Spain in the sixteenth century, and again when they passed under the dominion of France in the eighteenth. The native love of freedom, not unaided by England, enabled them twice to throw off the yoke; and the men of Holland would be equally impatient of the dominion of a Teutonic empire, which is at this moment the object of their apprehensions. We trust those apprehensions may prove altogether unfounded. But we believe that the first sign of an aggression on Holland would kindle the entire sympathy of Europe; and it is one of the first of British interests that the coasts and harbours within a few hours' sail of our shores should ever remain in the hands of a friendly people, and as inviolate as our own territory.
LEFT-HANDED ELSA.
VI.
The two judges, hitherto so impassive, started — they looked at one another. The students crowded round.
"That is not Max Brendel's," said one.
"That can't be Adolf Meyer's," said Sleinitz.
