Page:Littell's Living Age - Volume 132.djvu/145

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THE HELLENIC FACTOR IN THE EASTERN PROBLEM.
139

rel with the Porte, but also in accepting, with all the energy of his nature, that partnership in the patronage of the struggling Greeks, which was tendered to him by the Duke of Wellington on the part of the British government.[1] In Greece itself, the effect is described by Tricoupi in few words: ή Ελλας ήγγιζεν όλη: all Greece became English.[2]

Had Mr. Canning been a man of infirm purpose, or of narrow and peddling mind, he might readily have found excuses for disclaiming special concern in the quarrel between the sultan and his subjects. The party by which Lord Liverpool's government was supported did not sympathize with that or with any revolt. The Philhellenes of England were but a sect, limited in numbers and in influence. But, above all, there had been then no ground to fear lest Russia, by an affected or real protection, should shut out this country from her proper office. Russia had surrendered herself, in the main, to the debasing influence of Metternich.[3] She had, in 1823, in the character of an advocate for the Greek cause, produced a plan for dividing the country into three hospodariates, to be governed by native rulers, with the fortresses in the hands of Ottoman garrisons; and had even alleged, as a ground for its adoption, that it highly favored the principal families, and would detach them from the interests of the insurrection. Its single merit was, that it covered the entire range of the Hellenic lands; but it seemed to give ground for the accusation of Finlay,[4] that its aim was to keep Greek feeling in a state of chronic irritation, and thus to perpetuate the need of Russian intervention. At the outset of the war, the attitude of this great State had been one of undisguised hostility.[5] It not only dismissed Hypsilantes, who commanded in the principalities, from the Russian army, and gave the necessary consent for the entry of Turkish troops into those provinces to put down the insurrection, but it ejected from Russian territory, under circumstances of great severity, a hundred and fifty Greeks, who were refused admission into Austria, and into the Sardinia of that day, and who only, by means of private alms: were enabled to return to their country.[6] But Russia had also controversies of its own with the Porte, arising out of the articles of the Treaty of Bukharest (1812), and indirectly those controversies favored the cause of the insurrection, by requiring Turkish troops to be moved upon the northern frontier of the empire.

It was under these circumstances that Mr. Canning made his far-sighted appeal to the czar. And it was by the concurrence of the two countries that the work received an impetus such as to secure success. In the month of April, 1826, an important protocol was signed at St. Petersburgh, of which the leading terms are as follows. Greece shall be a tributary State, governed by authorities of its own choice, but with a certain influence reserved to the Porte in their appointment. The Greek people shall have the exclusive direction of their foreign relations. The lands of Turkish proprietors shall be purchased by the State. The second article provides for an offer of mediation with the Porte; and the third for the prosecution of the plan already declared, should the Porte refuse the offer. The delimitation of territory is reserved. The two governments renounce, by a happy covenant, imitated in 1840, and again at the outbreak of the Crimean war, all exclusive advantages, and all territorial aggrandizement. Lastly, the concurrence of the other three great powers is to be invited.[7]This protocol was followed, through the aid of British and French influence, by the treaty of Akerman, which settled the outstanding differences between Russia and the Porte, made further provision respecting the principalities, and re-established in principle the autonomy of Servia.[8]

The offer of mediation agreed on in the protocol was refused by the Porte, which now relied on its military successes, and which had not to deal with an united Europe; though the France of the Bourbons, much to its honor, had associated itself with the courts of England and of Russia. The refusal brought about the signature, in July, 1827, of the Treaty of London. This treaty was the great ornament of the too short-lived administration of Mr. Canning, as the policy, which it brought to decisive effect, was the crown of all his diplomacy. It provided for a renewed offer of good offices to the Porte, and for compulsory measures to give practical effect, in case of a renewed refusal, to the protocol of 1826. But, after not many days, Mr. Canning was no more.

  1. Ibid., iv. 2, 3.
  2. Ibid., iii. 267.
  3. La Russie et la Turquie, p. 82.
  4. Greek Revolution, ii. 165.
  5. Ibid,, i. 155, seqq.
  6. Ibid., ii., p. 166; Gordon, ii., p. 82.
  7. La Russie et la Turquie, pp. 92-94.
  8. Ibid., p. 95-101.