almost entirely composed of regiments temporarily detached from the surrounding corps.
As an attempt will presently be made to calculate the time which would be required for a mobilization, it is essential to complete, as far as can be foreseen, the list of the apparent causes of possible delay, so as to be able to allow approximately for their effect. It is, for this reason necessary to add to the catalogue of difficulties already enumerated, the observation that the rapidity of the first stage of mobilization may somewhat depend on the degree of organization of the regional and district magazines of stores. The organization of those magazines is determined by Articles 3 and 4 of the law of 24th July 1873: decentralization is its essential principle; not only must each region suffice for its own needs and borrow nothing from its neighbors, but each subdivision of each region is to be equally complete. Each subdivision corresponds to a regiment of infantry, and possesses two magazines. Those magazines are now ready everywhere. But several of the corps d'armee have no regional stores yet, and are still dependent for their supplies on the great central magazines. Thus, the 2d, 3d, and 5th corps draw their equipment from Paris; the 9th from Nantes; the 12th from Bordeaux; and the 13th from Lyons. All this is of course provisional, but how much longer is the provisional to last? France will not be really ready until it has disappeared for good.
It must, however, be acknowledged that, according to the experience supplied by the partial calling out of the reserves during the last two years, these provisional arrangements have worked fairly well. The men on those two occasions were dressed with sufficient rapidity: from five to six hours were required to equip the reservists of each company, and the only serious defect revealed was that the clothes in store were not sufficiently varied in size to fit all the new-comers, some of whom, consequently, could not be put into uniform at all. It is probable that the ministry of war has taken measures to remedy this, for the military newspapers took up the question energetically at the time.
Another fault which still remains uncured is the tendency of the officials of the ministry of war to delay things till the last moment, instead of doing as much as possible beforehand. The officers, for instance, have not yet got their cantines ready, either for luggage or for food. On I this particular point the arrangements are positively less forward than they were in 1870; for then each officer had his cantines de campagne at his own disposal, whereas now they have all been collected, into store, and are kept there empty. The filling them at the last moment will be a source of delay and difficulty, and of much personal annoyance. As a mobilization can only be successfully performed on condition that every detail of it has been thoughtfully worked out beforehand, it is quite worth while to allude even to such seeming trifles as these. The minister of war does really seem, however, to be giving his attention to small questions of this kind. For instance, it has just been ordered that, in the event of a mobilization, each vivandière shall receive a horse for her cart, and that all carts shall be of the same model.
It was stated in a previous article that, during a small private trial of mobilization made some time ago, three days had been absorbed by the registration of the equipments supplied to two companies. It was obligatory, according to the rules then in force, to write down in three separate books, for each man, the number of every article supplied to him — of his pouch, his waist-belt, knapsack, cartridge-box, sword-strap, and gun-strap. Each number was composed, on an average, of six figures, so that each man required 108 figures, or 16,200 figures for the one hundred and fifty reservists of a company. The ministry has at last given its attention to this absurd abuse of red tape. Simplifications have been introduced into the system of registration, and the time required for the work has been reduced one-half.
Let us now suppose that all the men have passed through successive stages, from their homes to their company. The mobilization, properly so called, is terminated. Concentration is about to begin. The time has come to ask what is the strength of the army. How many men has the mobilization produced?
As military service, in various degrees, for successive terms of years, has become a universal obligation in France, it follows theoretically that all the young men between the ages of 20 and 25 ought to be found in the active army; that all those from 26 to 29 should form part of the reserve; and that all the men between 30 and 40 ought to be found in the territorial army and its reserve. But fact, in this case, does not quite correspond with theory. In reality, not more than about half the available men of each year appear in the
