except from rebellion or invasion, would probably not happen. A large number of banks, each feeling that its credit was at stake in keeping a good reserve, probably would keep one; if any one did not, it would be criticised constantly, and would soon lose its standing, and in the end disappear. And such banks would meet an incipient panic freely and generously; they would advance out of their reserve boldly and largely, for each individual bank would fear suspicion, and know that at such periods it must "show strength," if at such times it wishes to be thought to have strength. Such a system reduces to a minimum the risk that is caused by the deposit. If the national money can safely be deposited in banks in any way, this is the way to make it safe.
But this system is nearly the opposite to that which the law and circumstances have created for us in England. The English Government, far from keeping cash from the Money Market till the position of that market was reasonably secure, at a very early moment, and while credit of all kinds was most insecure, for its own interests entered into the Money Market. In order to effect loans better, it gave the custody and profit of its own money (along with other privileges) to a single bank, and therefore practically and in fact it is identified with the Bank to this hour. It cannot let the Money Market take care of itself because it
