so much barren cash as is necessary for their common business. All the rest they leave at the bill brokers', or at the interest-giving banks, or invest in Consols and such securities. But in a panic they come to London and want this money. And it is only from the Bank of England that they can get it, for all the rest of London want their money for themselves.
If we remember that the liabilities of Lombard Street payable on demand are far larger than those of any like market, and that the liabilities of the country are greater still, we can conceive the magnitude of the pressure on the Bank of England when both Lombard Street and the country suddenly and at once come upon it for aid. No other bank was ever exposed to a demand so formidable, for none ever before kept the banking reserve for such a nation as the English.
The mode in which the Bank of England meets this great responsibility is very curious. It unquestionably does make enormous advances in every panic—
| In 1847 the loans on "private securi- | £ £ |
| ties" increased from | 18,963,000 to 20,409,000 |
| 1857 ditto ditto | 20,404,000 to 31,350,000 |
| 1866 ditto ditto | 18,507,000 to 33,447,000 |
But, on the other hand, as we have seen, though the Bank, more or less, does its duty, it does not distinctly acknowledge that it is its duty. We are
