We have remarked already on the strange apathy that had been shown by earlier Viceroys as to collecting accurate information about Burma from the traders, residents, and missionaries who might at least have given useful hints. Lord Amherst had to rely almost wholly on the report of Captain Canning, and as the lines on which operations were subsequently conducted were unfavourably judged by some contemporary critics, it may be as well to give a condensed extract from the document.
'Should an advance to Amarápura be contemplated, a larger force of 3,000 Europeans and 7,000 natives would be necessary. This, with a proportional detail of artillery and particularly gun-boats, would place the capital in our possession.
'Rangoon is accessible at all seasons, but during the strong prevalence of the south-west monsoon, from the beginning of July to the end of September, there is risk. . . . For the advance of a force on the capital the commencement of the rains or the beginning of June should be selected, and the rise in the river removes all obstacles from sand banks, &c., and a strong southerly wind would convey the troops to their destination in a month or five weeks.'
Captain Canning cannot make even a distant conjecture as to the number of men the Burmese could bring into the field. The absence of data is well illustrated by the fact that the population is variously estimated at from three to eighteen millions.
'Of a regular army they have no idea. "When troops are required, each district of a province is assessed at a certain number of men. . . . The men thus raised receive no pay; in
