Opinion of the Court
III
With respect to the question that we granted certiorari to consider—whether §363(m) is a jurisdictional provision—our answer is no, for the reasons that follow.
A
Congressional statutes are replete with directions to litigants that serve as “preconditions to relief.” Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 7). Filing deadlines are classic examples. United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S. 402, 410 (2015). So are preconditions to suit, like exhaustion requirements. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. 154, 157–158, 166, and n. 6 (2010). So, too, are “statutory limitation[s] on coverage,” or “on a statute’s scope,” such as the “element[s] of a plaintiff’s claim for relief.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 515–516 (2006). Congress can, if it chooses, make compliance with such rules “important and mandatory.” Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 435 (2011). But knowing that much does not, in itself, make such rules jurisdictional. Ibid.
The “jurisdictional” label is significant because it carries with it unique and sometimes severe consequences. An unmet jurisdictional precondition deprives courts of power to hear the case, thus requiring immediate dismissal. Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Servs. of Chicago, 583 U. S. 17, ___–___ (2017) (slip op., at 2–3). And jurisdictional rules are impervious to excuses like waiver or forfeiture. Boechler v. Commissioner, 596 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op., at 3). Courts must also raise and enforce them sua sponte. Fort Bend County, 587 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7).
This case exemplifies why the distinction between nonjurisdictional and jurisdictional preconditions matters. In light of Transform’s belated invocation of §363(m), the District Court stated that, “if ever there were an appropriate situation for the application of judicial estoppel, this would
