present, it would ensure a very high standard of tactical training, and enable the Divisional General to have a splendid reserve in his own hands for use at the critical moment of the fight as mobile as cavalry, in fire action more powerful than infantry, occupying the smallest possible front, yet capable of delivering a storm of some 10,000 bullets a minute with the maximum of accuracy and concentration.
The tactics in this book are based on the understanding that the machine guns are trained on this system, and that they are mounted on light, adjustable tripods and carried on trained pack-horses with the entire detachment mounted.
The failure of machine guns is due to two principal causes: (1) Insufficient training in working the guns. (2) Improper tactical employment.
It will be obvious that unless the gun can be depended upon to open fire with certainty and accuracy, and maintain it continuously without jamming or mechanical failure, it is useless to consider its tactical employment. The mechanism of the Maxim is somewhat complicated and delicate, and depends for its proper working upon the exact adjustment of each part; but no more so than any other piece of modern machinery—it is far less complicated and certainly far less delicate than the modern motor-*car. Indeed, the comparison is analogous in several respects, as both require highly trained operators to ensure their smooth and continuous
