deliver Paris from what they considered the despotism of a small terrorist faction. They argued in their indignation that they would defend the unity and indivisibility of the Republic from the encroaching violence of the capital. Buzot, in his Memoirs, gives a succinct statement of the plan they had proposed to themselves. This plan consisted in effecting a junction between the troops of the departments and the inhabitants of Paris; of re-establishing the Convention in its integrity, and of ensuring its liberty of action by a guard to be chosen from all the departments; and to have the members of the Convention tried by judges, to be likewise elected by the departments. This was the extent of Girondin federalism. A proclamation was drawn up at Caen for the purpose of raising a national force. Eight departments of Brittany and Normandy became the centre of the coalition, but in other parts of France, at Bordeaux, Rennes, Limoges, Marseilles, Besançon, Dijon, &c. there were symptoms of insurrection. The Girondins had entrusted their fate to the hands of General Wimpfen, who had served under Dumouriez—an excellent soldier, who put his sword at their disposal. While collecting troops, he issued an address to the Metropolis, proclaiming that his intention was to march towards not against Paris, for the sake of Paris itself and that of the Republic.
However fair-seeming these threats, veiled under an appearance of good intentions, civil war must have inevitably followed them, but for one insuperable obstacle, that of the sincere republicanism of the Girondins. Rage might have blinded them for an instant to the consequences of their proceedings; but they had no sooner clearly realised them than they gave up all thought of fomenting the insurrection. If their
