BOOK VIII
16. Remember that neither a change of mind nor a willingness to be set right by others[1] is inconsistent with true freedom of will. For thine alone is the active effort that effects its purpose in accordance with thy impulse and judgment, aye and thy intelligence also.
17. If the choice rests with thee, why do the thing? if with another, whom dost thou blame? Atoms or Gods To do either would be crazy folly. No one is to blame. For if thou canst, set the offender right. Failing that, at least set the thing itself right. If that too be impracticable, what purpose is served by imputing blame? For without a purpose nothing should be done.
18. That which dies is not cast out of the Universe. As it remains here, it also suffers change here and is dissolved into its own constituents, which are the elements of the Universe and thy own. Yes, and they too suffer change and murmur not.
19. Every thing, be it a horse, be it a vine, has come into being for some end. Why wonder? Helios himself will say: I exist to do some work; and so of all the other Gods. For what then dost thou exist? For pleasure? Surely it is unthinkable.
20. Nature has included in its aim in every case the ceasing to be no less than the beginning and the duration, just as the man who tosses up his ball.[2] But what good does the ball gain while tossed upwards, or harm as it comes down, or finally when it reaches the ground? Or what good accrues to the bubble while it coheres, or harm in its bursting? And the same holds good with the lamp-flame.
- ↑ cp. vi. 30; vii. 7. cp. Capit. xxii. 4: "Aequius est ut ego tot talium amicorum consilum sequar, quam ut tot tales amici meam unius voluntatem sequantur"; Digest. 37. 14. 17.
- ↑ Annius Verus, grandfather of Marcus, was the best ball-player of his day, see Wilmanns Inscr. 574. Marcus himself was an adept at the ball-game, Capit. iv. 9.
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