tinental schools is that of Külpe and the students and workers in the Würzburg Institut, Watt,[1] Ach,[2] Messer,[3] Bühler,[4] and others. Individual upholders of the theory are Binet,[5] Stumpf with his doctrine of Gebilde and Verhällnisse,[6] Cornelius,[7] and, finally, in spite of great divergence in terminology, Münsterberg and Ebbinghaus.[8]
Of writers in English, Stout,[9] R. S. Woodworth,[10] and the writer of this paper[11] have most explicitly taught the occurrence of these elements of consciousness, neither sensational nor affective, which are especially characteristic of what is called thought. Judd, also, describes concept and judgment in terms of relation;[12] and Angell, in spite of his denial of literally imageless thought,[13] seems to indicate by his term ‘meaning’[14] a relational experience.[15]
It thus appears that the introspection of a score of psychol-
- ↑ Archiv f. die gesammte Psychologie, IV, 288 ff., 1905.
- ↑ “Ueber die Willenstätigkeit und das Denken” (based on experiments carried on in Würzberg and in Göttingen), Göttingen, 1905.
- ↑ Archiv, I ff., 1906.
- ↑ Archiv, IX, 297 ff.; XII, 9 ff., 1908
- ↑ “L‘étude experimentelle de l‘intelligence,” Paris, 1903
- ↑ “Erscheinungen und Psychirsch Funktionen”, Königl. Akad. d. Wissenschaften, Berlin, 1907, pp. 7 ff., 29 ff.
- ↑ “Psychologie als Erfahrungswissenschaft”, pp. 70, 164 et al.; cf. also Zeitschrift, XXII, pp. 101 ff. (1809), where Cornelius develops a teaching of G. E. Müller.
- ↑ Ebbinghaus “Grundzüge”, I, pp. 410 ff.) recognizes as elements only sensations and affections, while Münsterberg (“Grundzüge”, I, pp. 290 ff.) admits sensations only. Yet the first includes under the head of ‘general attributes of sensation’ and the second groups int he class of value-qualities the identical part-experiences which are here considered as relational elements.
- ↑ “Analytic Psychology”, I, pp. 66, 78–96; II, p. 42
- ↑ “Imageless Thought”, Journal of Philos. Psychol. and Scientific Method, III, pp. 701 ff. 1906.
“The Cause of a Voluntary Movement” in Studies in Philosophy and Psychology by Students of C. E. Garman, pp. 351 ff.;
“Non-Sensorial Components of Sense-Perceptions” Journal of Philosophy, etc., IV, pp. 164 ff., 1907.
- ↑ “An Introduction to Psychology”, 1901, chapter X (especially in the second edition, 1905); “Der doppelte Standpunkt in der Psychologie”, 1905, pp. 25 ff.
- ↑ “Psychology, General Introduction”, 1907, pp. 286 ff.; cf. p. 72.
- ↑ Philosophical Review, 1897, pp. 646–657
- ↑ “Psychology”, 1904, p. 213 eta al.; cf. p. 2673.
- ↑ It is to be regretted that enthusiastic upholders of the relational-element doctrine have remained so comparatively oblivious of each other. I find only one writer, later than James, who refers to Spencer’s advocacy of the doctrine. The writers of the Meinong school seldom if ever mention any English-speaking upholders of the theory. Dr. Montague alludes, in the James Festscrhrift, to “Professor Woodworth’s discovery of the … non-sensorial elements of many topics of thought”, and Woodworth himself, in the three papers already cited, refers only to Bühler and other writers of the Würzburg school.
