accusation is of such character that, even if it is formally disproven on legal ground, it may still leave the accused an object of suspicion. You will, accordingly, Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Court, take it simply as evidence of the respect I bear you when I now go on to clear my honor in your sight, with the same solicitude as that with which I have defended my freedom. To this end it is necessary for me to present the grounds of fact, as painstakingly as I have presented the grounds of law, on which this accusation is to be quashed, and you will, therefore, I am sure, hear me with the same forbearance if this second part of my defense turns out to be but little briefer than the first.
I am accused of having violated Section 100 of the penal code. This section reads as follows: "Any person who endangers or jeopardizes the public peace by publicly inciting the subjects of the State to hatred or to contempt of one another, is liable to punishment by a fine of not less than 20 and not more than 200 thalers, or by imprisonment of not less than one month and not more than two years."
This section of the law specifies three different conditions, which must be found to concur if it is to be applicable.
I. There must be incitement to hatred or to contempt;
II. This incitement must be directed to the detriment of given classes of the subjects of the State, and I am accordingly accused by the public prosecutor of having incited the class of the unpropertied against the class of the propertied;
III. This incitement must be of such a nature as to endanger the public peace.
These three conditions must concur, must combine, if the section of the law is to apply,—and not one of these conditions occurs.
As to I. There must be incitement to hatred and contempt; there can in the case before you be no question of this point, and for several reasons.
1. The offense specified in Section 100 cannot be committed except there be an intention to incite to hatred and
