Page:Medical jurisprudence (IA medicaljurisprud03pari).pdf/344

But Holt C. J. said that the Court held the plea to be good, for it goes to the whole declaration; as to the battery and wounding the defendants plead not guilty, as to the residue of the trespass they justify; and the residue of the trespass comprehends the assault, and every other part of the declaration to which the plea (of not guilty) does not extend: and there is no need that the plaintiff should be of the college; for it appears that he exercised his faculty within London and the censors have jurisdiction within London and the suburbs, and seven miles in circumference; and it appears by the words of the Charter, that the censors have power to punish by fine and imprisonment; and how they exercise that authority we do not enquire, as it will be apparent afterwards in the answer to the first objection, and which is the most material one. In answer to the first objection, then, we say, First that the cause of the commitment is not traversable. Secondly if it were traversable, it is set forth with certainty enough. That the cause of commitment is not traversable appears by the authority which the censors have by the act of parliament; for by it they are constituted judges of fact, what is a mal-administration (of medicines) and what is not: and they are judges of record for they have authority to impose fine and imprisonment; and when a new authority is constituted, with power to fine and imprison, the persons invested with such authority are judges of record; for that every thing proves a court to be a court of record, viz. the power of fining and imprisoning; for courts which are not of record can neither set a fine nor commit any one to prison. 8 Co. 38. b. And there it is proved, that the leet can impose a fine, because it is a court of record; and forasmuch as the statute W. 2. c. 11 impowers the auditors to commit the accountant to prison the auditors are thereby made judges of record; as is observed 10 Co. 103. a. 2. Inst. 218. Then the censors being constituted judges of the matter, that which they have done as such they shall not be answerable for; and that a judge shall not be answerable for an act done by him as a judge, ap-