Munich
directed not at extra-European territories, but at land on our own continent.
Once made, such a decision does require single-minded devotion. There must be no half-measures or hesitation in attacking a task whose accomplishment seems possible only by exerting the very last ounce of energy. The whole political guidance of the Empire, furthermore, would have had to be devoted exclusively to this purpose; no step could ever have been taken under the influence of any consideration other than realization of this task and what it involved. They would have had to realize that the goal could be attained by battle only, and, with that knowledge, to await the course of arms in calm and composure.
All the alliances, then, should have been considered and assessed for their usefulness from this standpoint alone. If European soil was wanted, by and large it could be had only at the expense of Russia; the new Empire must have returned to march the road of the ancient Knights of the German Order, to give sod to the German plow by the German sword, and to win the daily bread of the nation.
For such a policy as this there was but one ally in Europe—England.
Only with England covering our rear could we have begun a new Germanic migration. Our justification would have been no less than the justification of our forefathers. None of our pacificists refuses the bread of the East, although the first plowshare was once a sword!
No sacrifice should have been too great in winning England’s friendship. We should have given up all thought of colonies and sea power, and avoided competition with British industry. Here only absolute clear-sightedness could bring success—abandonment of world trade and colonies—abandonment of a German navy. Concentration of every means in the State’s power on the army.
The result no doubt would have been a momentary limitation, but a great and mighty future.
There was a time when England could have been talked to in
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