Generals Carlin, King, and Starkweather; in the second under Colonel Morgan, General John Beatty, and Colonel Daniel McCook; and in the third under General Turchin, Colonel Van Derveer, and Colonel Croxton. Five division commanders and fourteen acting brigadiers were thereby rendered inactive. The changes in the sub-commands of the army were thus very sweeping.
General Negley was separately dealt with, and far more leniently than the two corps commanders. General Rosecrans, though considering him deserving of the severest punishment, allowed him to prepare a special defence against the statements severely reflecting upon his case in the reports of Generals Brannan and Wood. After receiving and examining the papers from him, the Commanding General came to the conclusion, as he wrote on October 14 to the War Department, that General Negley “acted according to his best judgment under the circumstances of the case.” He further gave him a leave of absence for thirty days, but advised him to ask for a court of inquiry. General Negley proceeded to Washington, and, on October 30, formally requested the Secretary of War by letter to order a court of inquiry in his case. The Secretary not acceding to this and advising him to return to the front, the General telegraphed to Chattanooga for orders, and received a reply directing him to return to the army on expiration of his leave. The case now took a very curious turn, worth relating in detail as it shows our military management in a peculiar light.
Having reached Nashville, he wired on November 10 to Chattanooga for orders. He was told, in answer, to remain in Nashville until further orders, and: “It is proper that you ask for a court of inquiry. It would not be proper to assign you to a command until an investigation has been had.” To this the General naturally replied that he had applied for a court, and renewed his request for one to the War Department, but heard nothing further from any quarter until he received an order, dated Chattanooga,
