Page:Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison Vol. 1.djvu/642

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INDIANA HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS

[John] Connor and four of their men to inform me of this circumstance and "that they had determined to go immediately to the Prophet's Town to endeavour to divert him from his purpose, that they would be with me in a few days and communicate the result of their mission, and that if they were unsuccessful in their endeavours to prevent the Prophet from striking us they would abandon him to his fate". From this statement of Facts, Sir, you will no doubt be of opinion with me that the return of the Troops under my command without effecting the dispersion or humiliation of the Prophet's Party would be attended with the most fatal consequences. If he is thus presumptuous upon our advance our return without chastising him or greatly alarming his fears and those of his followers would give him an eclat that would increase his followers and we would have to wage through the Winter a defensive war which would greatly distress our Frontiers. With this conviction thoroughly impressed upon my mind it is with the greatest mortification I have to observe that my advance to the Prophets Town depends upon circumstances which are entirely without my control. The supply of provisions on hand is by no means sufficient and the means of land transportation for it altogether inadequate. We have hitherto depended upon water transportation but it is impossible to rely upon it in our advance from this. From the winding course of the rivers and the nature of the ground near it the ascending Boats cannot be protected by the army. Defending them, by detachments is equally impracticable because I could not make them sufficiently large without weakening my main body so as to expose it to certain defeat. As soon as I received your letter therefore I directed the Contractor to send down to Vincennes for five or six waggons and upon the arrival of these must depend in a great measure the practicability of our advance. The Fort is in such forwardness as to enable me to leave it in three days but it is necessary that we should wait for the waggons. The necessity of this delay suggested the idea of obtaining a reinforcement. I have certainly the highest opinion of the bravery of the Troops under my command and the composition of this little army is entirely to my mind, but with regard to actual service they are altogether raw andinexperienced. The Militia are the best I ever saw and Col. Boyd's Regiment is a fine body of men. But like all men who are about to engage a strange and un-