Concentration order in February, 1897—Monthly death rate.
2. The insular representation is composed of two bodies, with the same authority—the chamber of representatives and the council of administration. Article 4 provides that the chamber is formed by popular election; but that concession, which at first seems extensive, when examined in its relations with the other powers given to the insular representation, is practically deficient. No colonial resolution can be in force unless it has been approved by the chamber and the council. The council, as we shall see later, from the nature of its composition, will be controlled by the Government in such a manner that the representatives of the people to the chamber will always find themselves in the power of the Government in some way. They will not be able to do anything, because if the council does not approve, or should modify the decision of the other house—the chamber—the latter's decisions will have no effect. The veto granted by article 43 will not be required.
3. The council of administration is composed of 25 members; 17 are appointed directly by the Government; the remaining 18 are elected by popular vote. To be elected a member of said council it is necessary to be a Spaniard (Spanish subject), 35 years of age, and possessing an income of $4,000 for two years previous to election. The formation of the council will be therefore controlled by the Government, because the Government will appoint unconditionally the 17 members, and it will be very easy for the Government to find one or more votes among those owing their election to the people, the more so as the conditions required to be a councilor are favorable to those near the Government. In order to pass any measure the presence of a majority of those composing this legislative body is required. It will be very difficult to have all the 18 members elected by the people vote as a unit, and the absence of one or two will be sufficient to give the governmental members control of the body, or the vote be a tie.
If the members elected should stand together on any measure objectionable to the Government, they could be sent to their homes by the Governor-General, and he can instruct or direct the election of others more accommodating. On the other hand, the members by governmental appointment can not be removed—their offices or positions cease with their lives. The Governor-General can not remove them. And to this end they will be carefully selected as faithful instruments of the Government, in whose hands the whole autonomistic machine will be placed. It is known that in Canada all senators are appointed by the Government; but it should be remembered that the Governor-General appoints them, with the advice and consent of its counselors or ministers, and that these counselors are elected by the parliament, and the parliament by the people, the result is, that in Canada the senators are representatives of the people, while here in Cuba the Government can control them.
4. As if the authority to veto was not sufficient (art. 43) and the power did not exist to suspend, close the sessions, and adjourn both bodies, or either of them, by the decree of the Governor-General, article 30 grants more authority or power to present [prevent?] or annul the freedom or liberty of the discussions of the colonial parliament, when, in the opinion of the Governor-General, the national interests will be affected by a colonial statute. The bill in question can not even be discussed unless previously authorized by the central government, and it is a limitation or restriction which has no precedent in any known autonomistic legislation. It is improper because the restriction arises before the debates show the character of the measure to be discussed. It reveals, besides, a mistrust or want of confidence of the mere discussion of the subject.
A Governor-General may decree. that all bills or colonial statutes may be, in his opinion, contrary to the national interest, and that nothing should be discussed in the local legislative bodies without the previous consent of the Madrid Government. All guaranties are for the Madrid power; there are none for the colony, except the one named in article 43, which fixes the limit within which the Madrid Government has to decide regarding the right of a veto which a colonial statute may have received from the Governor-General.
5. Article 36 grants exclusive power to the Cortes of the Kingdom to determine the expenses of sovereignty which the colony has to pay and the necessary receipts to cover them, for the Cortes can alter them at pleasure. Therefore the colony has no direct vote in a matter of so great importance. It may be said that she is allowed to appoint her deputies to the Cortes of the Kingdom, and that through them the colony can be heard. But the colony’s voice will be lost, because their number would be insignificant before the remaining deputies of the nation. And it may happen that the expenses of sovereignty, put by the Cortes on the colony, absorb all of its receipts, because neither of the two houses (chambers) can delib-