Chapter 7
Things are said to 'be' (1) in an accidental sense, (2) by their own nature.
(1) In an accidental sense, e.g., we say 'the just is musical', and 'the man is musical' and 'the musical is a man', just as we say 'the musical builds', because the builder happens to be musical or the musical happens to be a builder; for here 'one thing is another' means 'one is an accident of another'. So in the cases we have mentioned; for when we say 'the man is musical' and 'the musical is a man', or 'the white is musical' or 'the musical is white', the last two mean that both attributes are accidents of the same thing, which is; the first that the attribute is an accident of that which is; while 'the musical is a man' means that 'musical' is an accident of man. In this sense, too, the not-white is said to be, because that of which it is an accident is. Thus when one thing is said in an accidental sense to be another, this is either because both belong to the same thing, and this is, or because that to which the attribute belongs is, or because the subject which has as an attribute that of which it is itself predicated, itself is.
(2) The kinds of essential being are those that are indicated by the figures of predication[1]; for the senses of 'being' are just as many as these figures. Since some predicates indicate what the subject is, others its quality, others quantity, others relation, others activity or passivity, others its 'where', others its 'when', 'being' has a meaning answering to each of these. For there is no difference between * the man is recovering ' and 'the man recovers', nor between 'the man is walking' or 'cutting' and 'the man walks' or 'cuts'; and similarly in all other cases.
(3) 'Being' and 'is' mean that a statement is true, 'not being' that it is not true but false, — and this alike in affirmation and negation; e.g. 'Socrates is musical' means that this is true, or 'Socrates is not-white' means that this is true; but 'the diagonal of the square is not commensurate with the side' means that it is false to say it is.
(4) Again, 'being' and 'that which is', in these cases we
- ↑ i.e. the categories. Cf. note on A. 986a 23.
