costs, told me on the 1st of May that its effect on the front line of the enemy was so great that if they wished to undertake an offensive they would have to replace all their first line units by fresh troops.
Fraternisation was by no means instigated by the Revolution. It had existed before the Revolution; it certainly showed a great increase immediately after the Revolution, but then only as a spontaneous manifestation of the revolutionary enthusiasm of the Russian soldier. Even the refusal to fight and the panic-stricken rout before the advancing enemy were not unknown things in the days before the Revolution. It is true that in the Galician disaster last summer they assumed the most terrible proportions, but they were by no means an entirely new occurrence.
The Revolution is not, then, guilty of the decomposition of the Russian army. All the elements of decomposition were present before the Revolution; and its causes lay in the exhaustion of Russia. Nevertheless, future history will heavily censure the Revolution for not stopping the rot. The Revolution certainly should and could have stopped it. The new democracy of Russia had the true instinct, and the Soviet truly understood the great task of reorganising the Russian army. The inclusion of soldiers' representatives in the Soviet bears witness to its realisation that the strength of the new Russia must be based on unity between the workers and the soldiers. The much-discussed "Order No. 1," whether right or wrong in some details, clearly indicates that the Soviet realised the necessity of reorganising the army. The war had finally and definitely destroyed the army of Tsarist slaves. The "poor little grey cattle" ceased to exist; but there was a long way to go before the broken army of slaves could become a strong revolutionary army of the Republic. This could not be achieved by a miracle. It could only be brought about by a courageous and consistent realisation of the democratic programme of the Revolution. The new democracy of Russia should
