breakdown. Even in Germany, which suffered under the blockade and was injured by the war more than any other country, the economic life of the country was not undermined as it was in Russia. Germany's economic organism was only crippled; it was not destroyed. It remains intact in spite of all the blows which Germany has received during- the war. Only her functions have been temporarily arrested and slowed down. This is evident, if only from the fear of future German competition which is so widespread in this country. In the same way, the other belligerent countries have suffered—to a less extent than Germany—through a temporary dislocation of their normal functions, through a tightening of economic strain and the need for rigid abstinence or economy in certain raw materials, foodstuffs, and other commodities. But as a well-organised machine the collective economy in these countries works, if anything, more smoothly than before the war. It is better co-ordinated.
The economic sufferings of Russia are of a totally different character. Russia's exhaustion is organic. The ruin of Russian industry was a long process, and an inevitable result of the war and of the economic isolation of Russia in the war. It began immediately war broke out, and was more or less complete before the Revolution—i.e., before the class war and the demands of the workers could become an essential factor in hastening the final breakdown. The Revolution was the result of the economic exhaustion of Russia; not by any means its cause.
Besides the factor of economic isolation, three other factors effected the economic destruction of Russia. They were: (1) The enemy invasion and occupation of the best organised industrial districts of Russia; (2) the factor of depreciation or attrition—the wearing out of material in railways, factories, and workshops owing to the speeding-up and strain of war; and (3) the unsound and wasteful exploitation of raw materials, machinery, and labour by the State and the manufac-
