Per Curiam
relied on two cases, one from this Court, Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U. S. 740, 750 (1984), and one from its own, United States v. Johnson, 256 F. 3d 895, 908 (2001) (en banc) (per curiam). Neither case clearly establishes that Stanton violated Sims' Fourth Amendment rights.
In Welsh, police officers learned from a witness that Edward Welsh had driven his car off the road and then left the scene, presumably because he was drunk. Acting on that tip, the officers went to Welsh's home without a warrant, entered without consent, and arrested him for driving while intoxicated—a nonjailable traffic offense under state law. 466 U. S., at 742–743. Our opinion first noted our precedent holding that hot pursuit of a fleeing felon justifies an officer's warrantless entry. Id., at 750 (citing United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 42–43 (1976)). But we rejected the suggestion that the hot pursuit exception applied: "there was no immediate or continuous pursuit of [Welsh] from the scene of a crime." 466 U. S., at 753. We went on to conclude that the officers' entry violated the Fourth Amendment, finding it "important" that "there [was] probable cause to believe that only a minor offense... ha[d] been committed." Ibid. In those circumstances, we said, "application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned." Ibid. But we did not lay down a categorical rule for all cases involving minor offenses, saying only that a warrant is "usually" required. Id., at 750.
In Johnson, police officers broke into Michael Johnson's fenced yard in search of another person (Steven Smith) whom they were attempting to apprehend on five misdemeanor arrest warrants. 256 F. 3d, at 898–900. The Ninth Circuit was clear that this case, like Welsh, did not involve hot pursuit: "the facts of this case simply are not covered by the 'hot pursuit' doctrine" because Smith had escaped from the police 30 minutes prior and his where-
