Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/102

88 CEITICAL NOTICES : ological questions, we have, in my view implicitly though not explicitly decided the most important ontological questions ". The lectures forming the second part of the book may be taken as a criticism of the militant saying, repeatedly referred to, that the historical method has ' invaded and transformed all depart- ments of thought '. In what sense and to what extent is this true? Mathematics and abstract physics, Sidgwick points out, may be said to be unaffected by historical considerations. The nebular theory does offer us a ' speculative physical history ' of the physical universe as a concrete fact, but however far we carry it back, it leaves the differences or particularities of the cosmic fact as unexplained as at the beginning. In the nebula, ' the heterogeneity has not disappeared, it has only been broken up smaller '. If we pass to Biology, it is certainly true that the historical or evolutional method has transformed our knowledge of the organic world, but it is no less true that our theory of past change is based upon conclusions formed from scientific study of the present. Then, again, the Darwinian theory of the origin of man is often supposed to carry with it, if not materialism, at least the impossibility of the old belief in the continued existence of the individual after his physical death. But Sidgwick's con- clusion is that such an inference is entirely illusory ; the theory ' leaves the metaphysical problem of the relation of mind and matter exactly where it was '. As applied in Psychology, the method tends, as already argued, to confound psychical antecedents with psychical elements. " No ' analysis ' of any conception or belief can, I conceive, show it to be something other than careful introspection shows it to be. Analysis can only ascertain condi- tions, antecedents and concomitants " (p. 151). We are here, however, brought face to face with the question how far the validity of beliefs can be affected by an investigation of their origin and history. This investigation is conducted by Sociology, and in considering the claims made for the historical method in this connexion we may perhaps better term it the Sociological method and speak of the relation of Sociology to Philosophy. The question then is " how far a sociological inquiry into the history of our beliefs can and ought to affect our philosophical view of their truth or falsehood " (p. 162). It is certainly the case that, in such subjects as ethics, politics and theology, which are still subjects of controversy, a historical survey of the actual diversity and succession of human beliefs tends to beget a general scepticism as to the validity of any of the doctrines studied. Sidgwick admits that the tendency is natural, but he strongly denies that it has any logical justification. His- torical study has no similar effects in mathematics or physical science or astronomy, fantastic as the opinions and methods of earlier savants now appear to us. It seems to be of the nature of things that truth grows gradually out of error. Hence even though demonstrably false opinions may be found among the