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J. B. BAILLIE, Hegel's Logic. 101 improved and gives a key to the problem of the nature of the categories treated by Hegel in his Logic. In chapters vi. and vii., the important questions raised by the Phenomenology are treated in considerable detail and with Dr. Baillie's characteristic directness and intelligibility. Such ques- tions are those concerning the method of procedure, the origin and nature of absolute knowledge, its content and its relation to other forms of experience. The point, elaborated in this discussion, that absolute knowledge is not omniscience, and is nothing but the knowledge by mind of mind's own principles of operation, is one that needs always be kept in view by readers of Hegel. A thorough appreciation by writers on Hegel of this significance which Hegel gives to the term ' absolute knowledge,' would have very sensibly diminished Helegian bibliography. Merely passing reference can be made here to the excellent treatment of the notions of the Logic as at once concrete and abstract, as ideal and yet as real. We must hasten on to chapter ix. on the " Origin and Nature of the Method of the Logic ". " The fundamental characteristic of the Method of the Logic is its necessary and essential identity with the content" (p. 256). "It is not difficult to see what is meant by this identity of content with method. In the Phenomenology it was established that mind was the determining principle in experience as a whole, and in each part of it. Experience, as it appears, is the unfolding of the actual life of Spirit in all its manifold forms. Now not merely in each form, and not merely, again, in the whole was mind present, but itself determined the process from stage to stage, itself made the transition from form to form, and was that transition as much as the forms into which it passed. But if so, then since the content of the ' System of Experience ' was constituted by Mind, the con- nexion between its parts which made the system possible is similarly constituted. In other words, the Phenomenology is self- constructed and self-determined. It is one and the same mind which fashions the many expressions of experience into a single connected context, and which owns them as its experience. There is, therefore, no separation between the matter of the system and its mode of constitution. But it is clear from this that the method of construction must likewise pervade each part of the system as a part " (p. 257). There is therefore only one method from beginning to end, and this is true not only of the Phenomenology but of the Logic, for in both the method is the same (p. 261). This "method is simply the inner activity of Mind itself" (p. 259). The much discussed " transition " in the Logic "is the manner in which the moments of ultimate truth are built into the structure of Absolute Knowledge " (p. 262). " The truth which is the whole is not something over and above the truths of experience ; it is simply the latter in their unity. The only way to construct the system of such notions is to show their essential connexion as expressions of one and the same mind, which both is the specific