Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/119

L. T. HOBHOUSE, Mind in Evolution. 105 and individual accommodation through modification of structure in the course of the life and growth of the organism, he finds that it involves "a certain correlation, to put it in the most general terms possible, between the experiences and the actions of the individual and of the race ". The word "correlation " being thus used in a comprehensive sense, neither in its technical application in psychology nor with its biological implication, five stages are distinguished. The first, which stands in a category by itself, is named the Pre-intelligent Stage where response to stimulus is the outcome of inherited structure, where the correlation is not achieved within the experience of any individual, and where adaptation is confined within narrow limits. This stage, in Mr. Hobhouse's interpretation, only falls within the scope of orthogenic evolution, as defined, in so far as the conditions which make mind possible are then established. Instinctive reactions are its culminating products. Their nature and character, the co-operation, in their higher developments, of internal disposition some form of craving or stimmung with external stimuli to reflex action, and the criteria by which they may be differentiated from intelligent actions, are well brought out in the chapter on Instinct to which almost the only exception that can be taken is that Mr. Hobhouse in one passage seems to raise it to the power of a quasi- metaphysical faculty, when he says that the business of instinct is precisely to shape adaptable reflexes aright. In placing instinct entirely in a stage termed Pre-intelligent, it would seem, however, that the co-operation of intelligence in the genesis of some instincts is excluded. It is true that Mr. Hobhouse clearly notes the practical difficulty of disentangling the factors in some forms of behaviour. "Intelligence," he says, "arises within the sphere of instinct ; indeed, we can draw no sharp and certain line between them [as they occur] in nature. Yet in idea they are quite distinct. In so far as an act is instinctive, it is not intelligent, and conversely." But this does not preclude the origin of some instincts through lapsed intelligence. As used by Lewes and Eomanes, the phrase "lapsed intelligence" carried with it a Lamarckian implication based on the direct inheritance of the intelligent modification as an instinctive congenital character. But it has recently been shown that (on the hypothesis that Prof. Mark Baldwin has termed Organic Selection) congenital instincts may arise along the same lines that have been marked out by persistent accommodation to oft-recurring circumstances through the exercise of intelligence ; so that the origin of some instincts through "lapsed intelligence" may now be accepted without the Lamarchian implication of the inheritance of acquired characters. Still, broadly considered, it remains true that within the sphere of instinct, but not directly from instinct, intelligence is developed, and that its development opens out new lines of progress. In the second of the two main categories, which Mr. Hobhouse distinguishes, the correlation is based on individual experience.