Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/125

CHARLES A. MERCIEB, Psychology Normal and Morbid. Ill place, it is not true and, in the second place, if it were true it would be very far from being an adequate definition of reflex and volun- tary attention. Having made this false start the section proceeds somewhat chaotically throughout. Volition is defined as 'an exaggerated degree of Attention,' and the author loudly challenges the world to show that there is any ' element in Willing beyond Thinking and Attention to the thought reached '. The author's statements are very far from the truth, for it is a more nearly true general statement that volition and attention vary inversely in degree at any moment, that when attention is at a maximum volition is at a minimum. Every one knows that voluntary or willed attention is but a poor substitute for the spontaneous attention evoked by the interest of the subject-in-hand. All the confusion of this section arises from the fact that the author has failed, like most others, to seize the essence of the willing-process. The answer to his oft-repeated demand for a demonstration of an essential mark of the willing-process has been given perfectly clearly by Dr. Stout in his Manual of Psychology and, perhaps, by him only: "In voluntary decision special conations and their ends are first considered in their relation to the total system of tendencies included in the conception of the Self". "It is the conception of the Self as agent which makes the difference." How great a clarification of psychological writings will result when authors, undeterred by the fear of the transcendental Ego, accept and strictly adhere to this definition, theoretically so simple and clear, although in practice the application of it may be diffi- cult in a large group of cases. Dr. Mercier does but follow a too common practice in treating under the head of ' Voluntary Action ' all action that is not merely reflex or ' automatic '. But between reflex and voluntary action comes the immense group of conscious actions in which the conception of the Self plays no part as a de- termining factor. Let such actions be called conations, ideo-motor and sensori-motor actions, but let us reserve the term ' voluntary ' for willed action, for action that is in some degree determined by the conception of the Self. At present the usual practice of authors is to treat of willed or voluntary action, properly so called, under the head of ' conduct,' the term voluntary action having been improperly used to cover all kinds of conation above the level of the reflex and the ' automatic '. There are other instances of unsatisfactory use of language, as when (p. 482) ' Justice ' is said to be ' an emotion of late origin,' and on page 357 Honesty and Justice are said to be instincts, while on page 328 we are told that ' Instinct is, on the physical side, an inherited mechanism replete with motion '. So 'Justice ' becomes " an inherited mechanism replete with motion ". We are told (pp. 304-306) that at a certain level of animal evolution consciousness comes in as a factor influencing nervous changes, and on other pages occur statements of similar import ; but it is not possible to feel certain whether these imply a development of