Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/139

NEW BOOKS. 125 under three heads, the Natural laws of the will, laws according to which the movements of the will are determined. The second part deals with the Normal laws of the will, and centres round the conception of choice or preference. Here, again, Mr. Schwarz's main endeavour is to show that choice or preference are not acts of Reason or Judgment, but acts of Will. Preference is a volitional act governed by normative laws, laws, that is, which guide us in determin- ing what is better and what is worse. It may be either analytic or synthetic. In the case of analytic preference all we do is to sanction the better course ; in the case of synthetic preference we dictate it. Such dictation becomes imperative when we have to decide between values of different orders. In every such act of preference our decision is regulated by two principles, the one bidding us love our neighbours better than ourselves, the other bidding us love ourselves better than our pleasures. These principles do not merely ratify rules held good before, but provide out of their own normative essence an entirely new conception of what is the better. The distinctions of moral worth which they make originate from themselves. In a word, they create morality. The study of Ethics, as our author conceives it, is based on these two laws. As based on the one, it becomes the Theory of Moral Self-Asser- tion ; as based on the other, the Theory of Moral Self-Denial. Restricting our criticism to an essential point, we may question whether our author's concern to secure the.authoritativeness of the laws of synthetic preference by making them authoritative in their own in- alienable right is really well-advised. The ultimate question ' Wherein consists the sanction of these ultimate laws ? ' is a question that will not be put by. Must we not ask, ' What is the end towards which human nature by its very constitution is destined to strive ? ' and is not this end the ultimate standard of action rather than the bare fiat of certain solemn irresponsible laws ? The main gap in this striking work is the author's neglect to consider in his criticism the standpoint of modern Idealism, and yet Mr. Schwarz displays at every turn keen critical capacity. He has also the con- structive gift ; his distinctions are fine, his illustrations numerous and excellent. The Psychologic des Willens is the work of an earnest and gifted thinker ; it is stimulating and suggestive, and can be cordially recommended. It is a first instalment. Mr. Schwarz promises us the Ethics to which this Psychology is but the prelude. W. R. BOYCE GIBSON. Experimented Psychologische Untersuchungen uber das Urtheil. Eine Ein~ leitung in die Logik. Von Dr. K. MARBE, Privat-dozent der Philo- sophic in Wiirzburg. Leipzig: Engelmann. 1901. Pp.103. Price 3 m. The author rightly emphasises the fact that logical treatises at present contain a large quantity of psychological matter, much of which is too often the result of very casual introspection. What is by nature psychological ought to be examined without prejudice under conditions which ensure accuracy of observation, and these conditions he has attempted to attain in certain investigations upon the Judgment. He does not confine this name to true or false propositions, but regards as a judgment any mental process which can be characterised as correct or incorrect (richtig oder falsch). This assumption determines his whole procedure. Not only sentences can "become judgments," but words,