PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 133 philosophy aims at forming a conception of the universe as it is in itself and to furnish a complete explanation of it.] T. Segond. ' Publications recentes sur la morale.' Notices. Bibliographiques. Revue des periodi- ques Strangers. (Psychological Review. American Journal of Psychol- ogy. ) October, 1902. F. La Dantec. ' La place de la vie dans les phenomenes naturels (i.).' [Too long to summarise.] A. Binet. ' Le Vocabulaire et 1' Ideation.' [Record of a study of vocabularies of two sisters, subjected to the same influences but varying markedly in tem- perament.] Girard-Varet. ' Le langage et la parole : leurs facteurs sociologiques.' [Articulate language is not exclusively the outcome of an unconscious mechanism. It is the work not only of nature but also of man. It is a social phenomenon.] F. da Costa Guimaraens. ' Le besoin de prier et ses conditions psychologiques.' [The need of prayer is instinctive and organic ; it is part of the instinct of self-preservation. Like language, prayer also is a ' cry of the body '.] F. Paulhan. (Dis- cussion.) 'La Me'thode analytique dans la determination des caracteres,' Analyses et cornptes rendus, etc. REVUE DE METAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. 9e Annee, No. 5. Sep- tembre, 1901. C. Bougie. ' L'idee moderne de la nature (differenciation, heredite, concurrence.') [Under these names describes the theories (1) of Milne Edwards that, ' as Darwin concludes,' ' the degree of superiority of an organised being is to be estimated according to the more or less perfect localisation and differentiation of its organs and their special adaptation to different functions ' ; (2) of Lamarck that the modifications in an organ, due to the parent's use or disuse of it, may be inherited ; (3) of Darwin. Darwin explains the two facts which Edwards merely points out, namely, the existence of a variety (a) of species, (6) of organs ; and he points out a fact which Lamarck had neglected, namely, that the offspring of the same parents are born with differences which en- able some to survive better than others in the same surroundings. The account of ' Natural Selection ' is very clear and just and M. Bougie points out that the theory is purely ' mechanical ' in spite of Darwin's ' anthropomorphic ' language ; but, in classing it as a completion of the mechanical explanation begun in (1) and (2), he neglects the fact that (1) contains no explanation at all, either mechanical or ' finalistic,' and that the only fact, of which (2) fails to give a mechanical explanation, namely the individual's power of adaptation to its environment, is also not explained by Darwin. M. Bougie's object is to prepare for discus- sing the relation of this ' mechanical conception of Nature ' to Ethics ; but the fact that under his ' theory of differentiation ' he fails to dis- tinguish the ethical judgment, 'differentiation is a sign of superiority,' from the historical fact that differentiation has increased is only one instance of many confusions which his remarks on this subject betray.] G-. Cantecor. ' La morale ancienne et la morale moderne.' [A recent
- study ' of M. Brochard's holds that the ancients did not use the notions
of 'moral law,' 'duty,' etc., so prevalent in modern Ethics ; that hence these notions are ' factitious ' and of ' theological origin '. M. Cantecor will submit that they are ' necessary and true,' and will explain why, in spite of this, the ancients did not recognise them, and that their connexion with theology and metaphysics is due to misunderstanding. I. To believe in a moral law is only to believe ' that there is an authority, for man, distinct from his desires ' ; and this notion is logically implied in that of 'good,' since 'the good 'means 'what we ought to will'. The Greeks, having begun by an appeal to ' reason ' against ' external autho- rity,' naturally did not see (sic} that reason itself is an ' external authority ' in relation to our ' individual nature ' and our will : moreover, as was
