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PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 135 its ideas. The second article contains a mere suggestion that Spino/a must have been influenced very largely by Aristotle, in virtue of the fact that Hebrew philosophy, as represented, e.g., by Maimonides, was de- rived mainly from Aristotle through the Syrian and Arabian teachers and writers. Some striking parallels between Spinoza and Aristotle are mentioned to give cogency to this contention. M. Dauriac's essay is somewhat rambling and inconclusive. He dismisses the universal validity of the categories, insists on their "contingency," and then seems to bring back most or all that he has taken away from them by explaining that they " participate " in " necessity ". The last article is a continuation of a series on the same subject which has appeared in preceding numbers of the magazine. It is a very thorough analysis of some of Descartes fundamental conceptions, and a cautious review of Bayle's criticism. Amongst other points, one of considerable interest may be mentioned. Bayle's interpretation of substance varies through- out his criticism of Descartes, the truth being that he had in view two quite distinct conceptions of substance and did not see his way out of the difficulties presented by both. One was derived from scholastic Aristotelianism, the other from the new philosophy initiated by Des- cartes. According to the former substance is a kind of neutrum which can appear with different or even any attributes, and may hence be stripped of all, which makes any distinction between spiritual and material substance ultimately valueless. According to the latter it is held that attributes cannot be separated realite from substances at all, that they are the essence of substance, that extension, e.g., and matter are one and the same thing, and that thus there may be different sub- stances, but no remainder which is equally something or nothing. That this distinction has a very important bearing not merely on questions of nominalism and realism but also on most metaphysical questions need hardly be pointed out. ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE. Bd. xxviii., Heft 3 und 4. T. Lipps. ' Einige psychologische Streitpunkte.' [Three criticisms of Ebbinghaus. (1) Ebbinghaus's theory of fusion leads, if taken literally, to the absurdity that fusion is grounded in an enhancement of qualitative distinctness or independence. An examina- tion of Stumpf, Wundt and Ebbinghaus leads to the conclusion that the true basis of fusion lies in the congruent rhythms of the (unconscious) psychical processes which underlie sensation. (2) There is no such thing as a ' sensation ' of motion, or of tension or weight. Innervation sensa- tions are to be replaced, not by ' muscle ' sensations, but by certain ego- experiences, effort feelings, Strebungsgefuhle. The point is sustained by appeal to pathology. (3) The relation of similarity is nothing sensa- tional, not a general characteristic of sensation, but an apperceptive experience ; a predicate of two or more contents, e.g., of the two colours, red and violet, " wenn ich sie zusammennehme ". It is not given, as attribute of the colours, when these themselves are given.] E. Wiersma. ' Untersuchungen liber die sogennanten Aufrnerksamkeitsschwankungen.' n. [(1) Practice in mental work at a definite time of day appears to influence capacity of perception ; if this is the case, then the time of greater mental achievement may be shifted, despite an original dis- position. The large differences of perceptual capacity at different times of day make it necessary to experiment always at the same hour, if one is seeking to estimate mental achievement. (2) Capacity of perception is seriously reduced by mental and physical exertion. (3) The taking of 10 grammes of absolute alcohol reduces capacity of perception ; fatigue soon makes its appearance. (4) The taking of 3 grammes of bromide of