Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/163

THE DEFINITION OF WILL. 149 thus by one and the same means the idea, though a not-self, is felt as myself, and the opposing existence becomes a not- self at a higher remove. It thwarts the self in the idea and is so experienced as in collision with me. I have explained that I assume nothing as to any temporal or other priority, and I am far from maintaining the possi- bility in fact of a mere theoretical attitude. But to the reader, who will not forget this necessary warning, I will offer what follows as perhaps a help to a better under- standing. Let us suppose a self with an existing object, and let us suppose that the contents of the self and of its object are discrepant. The felt content of the self will here be hindered in fact by the not-self, but the self so far will not know that itself is hindered. It will on the other hand feel the uneasiness of its checked expansion and its object will become disagreeably qualified. But now let us suppose further that the main aspect, in which the self is hindered, itself qualifies the object inconsistently with the object's existence, and so itself becomes an idea for the self. With this the whole situation is forthwith changed. In this idea we have now an object in collision with existence and hindered by that. And the self now feeling itself to be specially at one with the idea, itself is hindered by existence and is aware of the hindrance. And the existence in this way has become not merely other but opposite. We in short have risen into the level of actual conation and will. 1 (iv.) The actual volition, we have seen, is the alteration of existence so as to agree with the idea. The existence, we may say, is changed by the idea to itself, and in the same process the self as one with the idea realises itself in the not-self. This process of self-realisation must up to a certain point be experienced as such by the self, and the self must become aware also however momentarily of the resulting harmony and peace. My world in a completed volition is not merely something which is there for me and which agrees with itself. My world has become so far the existing expression and realisation of my own self. And, so far as this result goes, the not-self persists only as the medium and element in which I have carried out and am satisfied with my being. It will repay us once more here to contrast the practical with the theoretical mode of consciousness. In the practical relation both self and not- self are alike qualified discordantly by the idea of the change. 1 1 will once more here refer the reader to my previous articles in MIND. Cf. also Appearance, pp. 606-607.