Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/185

THE DEFINITION OF WILL. 171 that this experience is changed to ABC | D, and that the process of this change, of myself from AB to ABC and of the not-self from CD to D, is perceived by me. And let us suppose also that there is no suggestion of this- change having arisen from the not-self. In this case I become aware of myself as changing outwards from a nar- rower to a wider self, a self that has become more than what it was, and has become this at the expense of the not- self. The process into the not-self, if so, is referred to myself as a further quality ; and experienced pleasure, though not essential, would contribute to my so taking it. There is here on the one side no foregoing idea which carries itself out, but on the other side there arises a perception of myself as active. So in the same manner my experience may change from AB j CD to A | BCD, this change being perceived as the invasion of me by the not-self. And here once again there will be no idea which realises itself in the result. Hence without any such idea we have the perception both of passivity and of activity, and it therefore is false that without an idea there is no experienced agency or will." I can identify myself largely with this objection but I cannot endorse it altogether. I do not think that in the absence of an idea I could possibly attain to the experience of agency. I should not under the described conditions either perceive myself as doing something or as having something done to myself. But if activity and passivity are used in a lower sense which stops short of agency, then under the above conditions I might be aware of myself as active or passive. And I should not myself object to the use of activity and of passivity in such a lower sense, at least so long as confusion is avoided. My perceived self- expandedness in what before was the not-self may thus, unless for some further reason the process is taken as be- ginning from the not-self, be regarded as the perception of my activity. And on the other side my self-contractedness, when my self is seen to become in part the not-self, may be an awareness of passivity ; so long, that is, as the result is not made to appear as beginning from my self. And in neither case will such an experience involve an idea, an idea, I mean, which carries itself out in the result. But such a lower activity, whether on the side of my self or of the not-self, must be clearly understood not to amount to agency. It is not agency at all, that is, so long as it remains is removed, such an example may perhaps explain the general sense of our symbols. Unfortunately with the restriction and enlargement there goes also a qualitative change.