Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/220

206 BEEKAED BOSANQUET : as far as any one acts well, there are fewer stages to be traversed before the advent of the supreme good, than if he acted ill. I have so far argued against the author (a) that in moral- ity it is a grave defect for the criterion to be extraneous ; (b) that it can only be applied through a systematic individual- ised construction ; (c) that achieved good remains, even if it passes through the form of evil, and therefore if we see our way to what has the character of good, we need not be sceptical as to further tendencies, except on positive grounds which we must estimate in judging it good. We may now approach the discussion on the two proposed criteria, Perfection and Pleasure, so far departing from the author's treatment as to take Pleasure first (points 2 and 3 of sect. 102), because I hope that the criticism developed in discussing these will be of use to us later on, in dealing with point 1, the alleged uselessness of perfection as a criterion. I. Point 2, then, is thus stated (sect. 102), "that the Hedonic computation of pleasures and pains does give us a definite criterion, right or wrong ". We should note that Psychological Hedonism being dropped, the Pleasure of All, of course, is the proposed criterion. The discussion of it begins with section 111. (a) We shall readily admit to the author in general that " we know what a pleasure is, and what a pain is, and we can distinguish a greater pleasure or pain from a lesser one ". There are, however, states of consciousness, as he points- out, about which we can hardly be sure whether they are pleasures or pains, and many cases in which it is hard to decide which of two pleasures or pains is greater. But, he argues, a difference of which we cannot be sure must be less than any appreciable difference, and a possibility of mistake thus limited can only concern a very small amount of pleasure. The uncertainty thus arising, it is implied, does not show that the criterion by calculation of pleasures fails to give a fairly precise decision. This contention, I think,, must be admitted ; as here we are not raising the question whether the criterion is right or wrong, but only whether it gives an answer at all. In speaking of its correctness we sha 1 have to recur to this point. (b) Next comes the objection based on pleasure being an abstraction. It is urged, the author says, that for this reason "pleasure" is an impossible criterion, being something, in fact, which nobody experiences. The objection, thus stated,.