Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/232

218 BERNARD BOSANQUET : their nature, and this would be the required Hedonic calcu- lation. But my point is, that the laws of the combination f though certainly not irrational, are yet not arithmetical. They are the laws of the logic of desire, by which its objects include, modify, reinforce or supplant each other ; and they deal in every case with the growth of an individual concrete whole, perpetually modifying itself. Deliberation which con- sists in a phase of the life of such a whole differs in principle from the type of calculation. In answer to these remarks Mr. McTaggart would per- haps refer me to that part of his argument (sect. 132), in which he maintains that Hedonic calculation is not always a correct guide to the fuller development of our ideals, but only to their fuller satisfaction by the environment. It is indeed probable that my difference from him consists in suggesting that the object of desire likely to give satisfaction under the conditions of present action is ascertained by a process much the same as that which he confines to the change or modification of our ideals in lapse of time. " Our desires," he says (loc. cit.), " have a dialectic of their own." The phrase seems just what is wanted to express the real determination of conduct with a view to satisfaction, of which, as I believe, Hedonic calculation is a travesty. I will try to explain further below. II. So far we have been dealing on the whole with the question (point 2 of sect. 102), whether the calculation of pleasures and pains gives a definite moral criterion, right or wrong; though it has not proved possible to keep, this- wholly apart from the general discussion of Hedonism. Now we turn to point 3 of section 102 and ask (sect. 104)," Even if pleasure gives us a criterion which is applicable, does it give us one which is correct ? " The author's answer involves the distinction which has just been mentioned. The Hedonic criterion would be d trustworthy guide to that element of the Supreme Good which consists in satisfaction of actual ideals. To develop- ment or perfection of the ideals themselves it does not bear a uniform relation. Subject to this distinction, the positive argument advanced occupies only six lines. Happiness is c proportioned to harmony with surroundings ; if we aim at Happiness we aim at harmony between individuals and their surroundings, and this is to aim at one element in the supreme good. It should be noted that this argument if successful would destroy the relevancy of the objection taken above to an extraneous criterion. I believe however that this argument is itself irrelevant.