Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/266

252 CRITICAL NOTICES : This rationalism, then, which, by its elimination of the accidental as unreal, becomes also a conceptual atomism, involves by its elim- ination of contingency from reality a view of nature so abstract that no room is left for change and the operation of physical causes, so that causation is necessarily identified with explanation. Our author proceeds to show that whether we insist on the abstract conceptualism of Descartes' scheme or on its atomism we are either way inevitably led to a thorough-going Occasionalism. One of the most instructive features in these studies is the way in which our author shows how the imperfections of Descartes' rationalism, not only in his own writings but in that of his followers, are shown up at every turn by the logical necessity of resorting to an illogical deus ex machind, the occasionalistic solution being " the attempt to introduce in an external form that necessary relation to .the infinite which ought to have been kept in view from the start ". To con- struct a philosophy on an abstract basis, whether on rationalistic or empiricist lines, is simply to court the necessity of occasionalistic theory. Thus Dr. Ward's criticism of Spencer's philosophy in his Oifford Lectures amounts to a censure of Spencer's Occasionalism. We infer, indeed, from our author's treatment that the only way of avoiding Occasionalism in the development of a philosophical theory is to start, without making any assumptions, from an analysis of actual experience. This is the final conclusion of the book as reached in the chapter dealing with the transition to Kant, and, in its general form, seems to be one of those truths which philosophers might well be induced to accept as a common basis for further discussion ; the conflict might then be suitably concen- trated on the meaning to be attached to experience. Occasionalism means further the introduction of an unauthorised Spiritualism into philosophical doctrine and into the Cartesian doc- trine in particular. ' Spirit,' we read, ' is in the system of Leibniz, as in that of Descartes, the deus ex machind that solves all the irresolvable difficulties caused by a rationalism that is based on the scholastic doctrine of essence. Hence we are not surprised to find further on that " with Hume's destruction of the occult self, the occasionalist system of Descartes collapses like a house of cards ". The fortunes of the doctrine of representative perception through all the line of thinkers between Descartes and Kant are fully dis- cussed by our author. Indeed the greater portion of the volume is devoted to following up the history of Descartes' three funda- mental tenets, his theory of representative perception, his rational- ism and his spiritualism, to their final collapse under Hume and Kant. In Spinoza it is Descartes' rationalism which is the main undermining influence, compelling Spinoza to identify causation with explanation, to evolve an empty pantheism the counterpart of the Cartesian atomism and so to negative a strong tendency of his to view reality concretely, a tendency not sufficiently recognised by Spinoza's critics. In Leibniz, Descartes' rationalism, through the doctrine of essences on which it is based, affords the mainstay