Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/329

HEDONISM AMONG IDEALISTS. must be a question of our individual experience and capacity. On this depends the soundness of our judgment in incur- ring immediate contradictions, that is, in making sacrifices (whether merely in our own persons or in the persons of those whom we are able to affect) with a view to possi- bilities of development either future in the lives in question, or wholly beyond them, or remaining partial and painful within them. This judgment is just of the same order as that which we are testing daily and hourly in accepting prima facie sacrifices or contradictions for the sake of the whole. It seems to me precisely analogous to our behaviour in the realm of theory, which mainly consists in deciding what contradictions are ad hoc to be disregarded, and what, as more fundamental, we must apply our scientific resources to reconcile. Ultimately, no doubt, the idea of the Supreme Good must include what for us are the separate aspects of theoretical and practical perfection. But speaking in more relative terms we may say that the idea of perfection is for conduct what the idea of system is for science. CONCLUSION. The most serious objection to these views which I should expect to be advanced, would be that according to them we make no use of the definite content of the abstract idea of supreme good, as metaphysically established (I suppose) for all possible worlds, in determining our conduct. We use it in a confessedly imperfect form, in which, I think Mr, McTaggart might probably contend, the empirical and meta- physical elements are undistinguishably mixed, and therefore it cannot be truly said that morality thus determined rests on a metaphysical basis, as Green for instance seems to assert. This point was referred to some pages back, but it may be well to recur to it in conclusion. The answer would, I think, begin by accepting the imperfection of morality as a whole, and of our morality. As Mr. McTaggart insists, perfection could not be realised in an experience like ours. In attained perfection we should have, or there would be, a complete experience forming one harmonious web with the idea of per- fection ; and as all would be true and satisfying no question would arise how much was false. In our imperfection, we are haunted by this question, and we must admit that the whole tissue of our morality is tinged with falsehood. "Nevertheless we are able, from a metaphysical standpoint, to verify an idea of perfection as working throughout the tissue of life. We cannot apply it to particulars of conduct