324 MAEY WHITON CALKINS I rectangular,' and the ' good ' is of necessity the ' not-bad '. A parallel set of categories, discussed only in book ii., is applicable, however, only to the concrete thing and never to the single quality. These are the cate- gories of Likeness and Unlikeness. A thing, Hegel teaches, implies other things not only because its identity with itself is a difference from others, but also because it is always ' like ' some other things and ' unlike ' others. The definition of a thing is always, in truth, an enumeration of the ways in which it resembles some other things and differs from others still. The crab-apple, for instance, is like the cherry in form, like the pear in surface, like the peach in colour, and thus unlike pear and peach in form, unlike cherry and peach in surface, and unlike cherry and pear in colour. Hegel shows in detail how the categories of Likeness and Unlike- ness proceed from those of Identity and Difference. Each of them, it is made clear, involves partial identity and partial difference : " Difference as an identity of the objects related is Likeness ; as non-identity of them is Unlikeness". 1 For example a rose which is like another has perhaps identity of colour but difference in form, and indeed could never be called 'like* unless in some sort distinct. Thus, likeness and unlike- ness, as well as identity and difference, are seen to imply the existence of related others ; and it is therefore plain that ultimate reality can never be stated in terms of any one quality or thing. The argument from identity and likeness is repeated in 'book iii., but in terms which greatly lessen its force. Hegel expressly admits the equivalence of those categories of book iii. with those of book ii : "Universal, particular and individual," 2 he says, "are, taken in the abstract, the same as identity, difference and ground". Universality thus means the likeness of one thing to another by virtue of the fact,, that they share each other's qualities : particularity is the Unlikeness of one thing to another, that is, its failure to share certain qualities ; and the individual, like the thing, is the complex of qualities. This parallelism is, it must be confessed, much obscured by the title of the first division of book iii., " The Subjective Notion ". For this term applies most naturally to realities of consciousness and not to mere qualities and things. But no attentive student can escape the force of Hegel's reiterated teaching that ' subjective ' does not mean ' conscious r and that the terms ' notion ' and ' judgment ' apply to external as well as to internal facts. 3 "All things," he says, "are a judgment:" 4 and his dis- cussion of judgments is closely parallel to his consideration, in book ii., of things. In brief, the argument of this part of book iii. runs as follows : An individual is necessarily described in terms of its resemblance to other individuals. This likeness to others is of various degrees and forms, but the fewer and the less essential the resemblances that is, shared qualities the more incomplete and inadequate the description of the individual. In other words, the individual consists of its shared qualities : in its ver}' nature, it implies the existence of others. The single, unrelated individual is, therefore, impossible. In detail, these different sections consider the nature of the resem- blances of one individual to others. These likenesses may be sensational (in the Qualitative Judgment), relational (in the Judgments of Reflexion 1 Encycl, 117 ; Werke, iv., S. 41. seq.
- EncycL, 164 2 ; cf. Werke, v., S. 35.
3 Cy. McTaggart, MIND, N.S., vi., 1897, 166.
- Encycl, 167 1 ; cf. Encycl., 181 ; Werke, v., 115 3 ; cf. also Kant, Kritik
d. reinen Vernunft, Transc. Analytik, 19.
