HEGELIAN CATEGORIES IN THE HEGELIAN ARGUMENT. 331 ence of other individuals. At this point, the new conception emerges : ultimate reality is a syllogism, namely, a system of related individuals, bound together by ties of universality, that is, of likeness. 1 Or, in Hegel's own words: "Everything is" turns into, is seen to imply "a syl- logism ". 2 The system of like realities, however, as Hegel proceeds to show with great elaboration, that is, this system of individuals connected through universals, must be a complete system, if it is to be indeed ultimate reality. Upon this point, here as in book i., Hegel lays great stress. Under the misleading title, "Qualitative Syllogism," he shows clearly that one group, among several, of resembling individuals can no more constitute fundamental reality than any one of the individuals. For the common quality on which this system is based will be, in the first place empirically observed 3 and very likely unessential ; and it will, of course, be one quality only among the many qualities of each one of the in- dividuals in the system, so that the system will not adequately represent the individuals composing it. Thus, the rose, because red, is a coloured object ; but if ultimate reality be denned as the totality of coloured ob- jects, such a system does not even truly represent the rose, for a flower has other qualities than colour. 4 It is quite evident, therefore, that the system, or universality, of like objects, so long as it remains incomplete, implies the existence of still another incomplete system, and that these incomplete systems have to be linked together in a complete totality, or, as Hegel calls it, a Syllogism of Allness. This complete system of distinct individuals bound together by all conceivable resemblances, however complex and intricate the com- binations, is, thus, the only sort of whole-of-resembling-parts which meets the requirements of ultimate reality. We have before us, therefore, in obscure terminology but in unmistak- able outline, the theory of ultimate reality as the complete whole of all realities in perfect relation of likeness. But the conception involves an inherent contradiction. The very completeness which is its distinctive feature is impossible unless the unity be more than that of a mere sum or whole. For, as Hegel proceeds to show under the heading "Syl- logism of Reflexion " such a complete sum, or syllogism of allness, is contingent and unknowable, because it is an affair of mere induction or of analogy. 5 Clearly, therefore, if ultimate reality were a mere All, it 1 Hegel sometimes uses the term 'syllogism' of any whole of parts, and not merely of the whole of like parts (cf. Werke, v., 191 2 ; Encycl. r 197). But the latter is the usual meaning of the term.
- Encycl., 181 2 ; cf. Werke, v., 122 1 .
Encycl., 184, cf. Werke, v., 118 A., seq. 4 KiicycL, 184 : " The Middle Term being an abstract particularity is nothing but any quality whatever of the subject ; but the subject being immediate and thus empirically concrete, has several others and could, therefore, be coupled with exactly as many other universalities as it possesses single qualities " (cf. Werke, v., 123). 5 Werke, v., 150 seq. ; EncijcL, $ 190, note : "The syllogism of Allness hands us over to the syllogism of Induction . . . that presupposes that over a certain region observation and experiment are complete. But the things in question here are individuals ; and so again we are landed in the progression ad infinitum. In other words, in no induction can we ever exhaust the individuals. Every induction is consequently imperfect." In the still more imperfect " Syllogism of Analogy," we conclude from the
