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VIII. CEITICAL NOTICES. The Ethics of T. H. Green, Herbert Spencer, and J. Martineau. By HENKY SIDGWICK. Pp. xli., 374. Macmillan, 1902. IT is pointed out in the Preface that the works which these Lec- tures discuss appeared subsequently to the first publication of the Methods of Ethics. This volume therefore forms a very im- portant supplement to that work. To Green it gives 130 pages, to Herbert Spencer 182, and to Martineau 62. The criticisms, though clearly put as we should expect from Sidgwick, are very brief, and correspondingly numerous. It would be an excellent exercise for any student to go through them point by point, but the result of such a process could not be compressed into a re- view. I will take what seem important questions. In the lectures on Green, after expressing a qualified agreement with Green's dismissal of "naturalistic ethical sanctions" as founded on illusion, the author passes to Green's Metaphysic as contained in the Prolegomena, Book I. (p. 9). He briefly indicates a difficulty in the theory itself (whether the unifying principle need necessarily be self-conscious) and in its bearing on the unity of the individual's consciousness. As to the former point, I should admit that Green's expression is doubtful if taken strictly as against consciousness, but not if taken widely as against the unconscious. I do not know which of these the author meant to assert. As to the individual consciousness, the explanation in the Prolegomena (sect. 68) appears to me to be sound. But what really engages the author's attention is the question how Green is to get any Ethics ort of his Metaphysics. He criticises the expres- sions which suggest that Green's laborious argument has led us to no knowledge of the infinite spirit, as if they implied that Green relied on a belief which goes beyond his reasoned conclusion. I think there is possibly a real fluctuation in Green's attitude as to the degree in which the general conception warranted by Meta- physic amounted to a " knowledge " of the infinite spirit. (See Memoir, cxlii. I may be allowed to remark at this point that Sidgwick seems to me to treat the Prolegomena rather as a re- viewer than as an investigator. I mean that he hardly ever refers to Green's other works, and never to Nettleship's Memoir, which is founded on a study of the whole works, in order to illustrate or