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H. SIDGWICK, Ethics of Green, Spencer, and Martineau. 387 tried to grasp the bearings of his author's system ; while Sidgwick has modernised as a wider reader with immense literal knowledge, but having never really considered how Aristotle's philosophy hangs together and how its parts modify each other's significance. In Aristotle this is particularly dangerous. It is quite certain, that one may read long sections (see p. 93) with careful attention, and yet wholly miss their point if ignorant of the philosophical framework. I take one example, using, as Sidgwick sometimes does in Green's case, the remarkably excellent analytical summary prefixed by the editor. " Aristotle . . . does not suggest that Wisdom, Courage, Temperance and Justice were valued by Com- mon Sense as conducive to the unfolding of the capacities of the rational man in full harmonious activity." We are speaking, I presume, of Aristotle's own theory (p. 82 top, p. 89) and the allusion to Common Sense is merely an obiter dictum, referring to its sup- posed source. If we compare this statement with any good editor's explanation of the doctrine of the mean, we shall be at a loss to understand Sidg wick's position. Even on the question of Hume's Hedonism, and Hutcheson's position, where Sidgwick should be facile princeps, I find grave cause to doubt the soundness of his view, and the justifiability of his tone in referring to Green. He characterises Green's state- ment that an act of a man's own necessarily proceeded according to Hume from some desire for pleasure (Sidgwick, p. 104) as " a simple blunder due to ignorance ". It does not quite seem to me to have been so. I read it as an elliptical statement by an expert, of a contention which he had elsewhere maintained in a careful argument with full discussion of opposing evidence. It would have been better if Green had referred, perhaps in a foot- note, to the opposing evidence which he had elsewhere discussed. Probably if he had revised his book he' would have done so. I mention the point in part because it leads up to a suggestion which the lectures have forced upon me. Sidgwick judges Green ,by the distinction between Psychological and Ethical Hedonism. But I believe this is a misleading distinction, certainly as to Hume and Hutcheson, and perhaps as to Sidgwick himself. There are, it seems to me, different degrees of psychological Hedonism, but all Hedonism, except Mr. McTaggart's (and as to this I am not sure), is psychological. Sidgwick much underrates, so far as I can see, the tendency of the pleasure-motive to be taken as the sole motive for a self-conscious and reflective moral agent, certainly in Hume and even in Hutcheson. The very Appendix on Self- Love, which he charges Green with having forgotten, is shown by Green in his full discussion to point that way. And Hutche- son's elaborate Hedonistic calculus, together with other expressions in his writings, justify a doubt how thoroughly he had emancipated himself, as no doubt was his intention, from the working theory that in every object what is sought is a pleasure, though not the pleasure of success in attaining the object.