Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/409

JAMES SULLY, An Essay on Laughter. which determines our laughter is describable as an intellectual effort and its frustration. ' In every instance (Schopenhauer tells us) the phenomenon of laughter indicates the sudden perception of an incongruity between a conception (Begriff), and a real object which is to be understood or ' thought ' through this conception ' " (p. 130). Against this Dr. Sully urges that the calling up of this general representation is only occasional and not necessary. " To recognise a weasel we do not need to have a pictorial idea or image of a weasel as formed from past observations " (p. 14). Similarly, " when 1 envisage a person as oddly dressed I do not need to have a schematic representation of the proper style of dress. The same holds good in many cases in which a rule of good manners is broken " (p. 131). At most we have a "conceptual tendency," an " apper- ceptive acceptance or rejection of a presentation ". Laughter at harmless vices does not imply the simultaneous presence of this "exalted concept" of a perfectly virtuous man. Further, were this true we ought to laugh most at the frailties, e.g., of Falstaff, when first revealed, whereas we laugh more freely when his ras- cality has become familiar. This criticism does not seem to me to be conclusive. When Schopenhauer constitutes the ludicrous in an incongruity between an object and the conception (Begriff} under which it tends to be thought I doubt very much if by " Begriff" he means " a pictorial image," a " schematic representation," or even "a generic image" in Mr. Sully's sense. It is at least possible to realise in conscious- ness a general rule, e.g., Schopenhauer's example "Cheats are to be ejected," by a thought which is not merely an image. Further, when w r e pronounce an occurrence to be irregular or in conflict with the rule the meaning of the rule is present to the mind, and this, I think, is something more than an apperceptive ' tendency,' though possibly Mr. Sully may be able to enlarge the significance of this term so as to include in it Schopenhauer's Begriff. But the question obviously would plunge us in the deeper strata of Erkenntnisstheorie. The further argument does not seem to me to possess real force. The contemplation of the consistency of the delinquent's character affords a new pleasurable excitement. If there be no variety in subsequent cases the pleasure will speedily dimmish. The general outcome, however, of Prof. Sully's criticism seems to me thoroughly justified. " Neither of the tw^o chief types of theory covers the whole field of the laughable, each has its proper limited domain " (p. 136). I have already occupied so much space that I am unfortunately precluded from discussing Dr. Sully's treatment of the origin of laughter. I regret still more that there is not room for me to dwell on the pair of long and excellent chapters on " Humour " and " Comedy " in which the author's powers are seen at their best. I have only to say before I close that the reader will find in this volume of Prof. Sully a most interesting and instructive w r ork. Independently of the valuable information and of the happy and