Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/483

IDEALISM AND EMPIRICAL REALISM. 469 logical argument, which is the characteristic of Kant's "critical" philosophy, but which can be satisfied only by placing space as well as time in me, and therefore cannot properly be applied to a space outside me, except by confusing this with the space inside me. 1 In the Refutation, however, the reference to a " space outside me " is plain, with its necessary implication of a space out- side my space, since my space is in me. And here towards the end of the Analytik in the second edition this second account of Empirical Realism is employed throughout. This is an improvement upon the treatment in the first edition in the Dialektik, where the first account of Empirical Realism was the only one avowedly employed (i.e. in the argument or first assertion), though he ran off into the second whenever he could escape into it (in the conclusion or restatement). 2 1 The argument in the Refutation was directed at proving merely this : " Also ist die Wahrnehmung dieses Beharrlichen [in der Wahrnehmung] nur durch ein Ding ausser mir und nicht durch die blose Vorstellung eines Dinges ausser mir moglich " ; and the argument in the First Analogy only sought to prove that in the Gegenstande der Wahrnehmung (and consequently in the Dinge ausser mir) there must be something permanent, their substance. In both cases it is only by means of the confusion of taking Ding ausser mir as equivalent to Ding im Raume, or extended thing, and of placing it both in me and out of me, that the ultimate conclusion desired is reached. In earlier issues of MIND, Kant has been accused by Mr. Balfour of having in his Refutation confused " being in space " with " being outside the mind and other than one of a series of conscious states," vol. iii., no. 12 (1878), p. 498 ; and by the late Prof. Sidgwick, replying to a defence by Prof. Caird, of having confused " externality in space" and "externality to consciousness," vol. iv., no. 15 (1879), p. 410. But really in this passage Kant made no allusion at all (as he had done in the omitted passage in the first edition) to exter- nality to consciousness (of the things-in-themselves), and his confusion was between two kinds of externality in consciousness between exter- nality in the sense of extension in space in me and externality in the sense of existence in a space outside me, and outside every one else, and yet. according to his doctrine, somehow in some one consciousness, and still empirical even to me, instead of transcendental (like that of things in themselves). Outer objects in this space, we shall presently see, are treated as intermediate between the extended objects (in this sense " outside me ") which are wholly in me (my extended modifications or representations), and the objects (not extended) which are wholly out- side me (the things-in-themselves). Without recognition of the threefold use of such terms as "object," "outer," and many others (two of the meanings being taken as empirical, although only one is wholly so), it is impossible to understand Kant, and to make one's way through the maze of his verbiage. 2 The greater emphasis laid upon the second kind of Empirical Kealism jn the second edition was no doubt due to desire to avoid the criticism of " Idealism " (the eighth hi our list) which had been brought against him after the publication of the first edition, as may be seen by consulting the intervening Prolegomena.