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510 A. E. TAYLOR : I venture to submit that the interpretation is impossible both on linguistic grounds and in view of the context. Would Mr. Benn maintain that, e.g., oXov ko-rl TO A is Greek for the law of Excluded Middle ? And how could Plato pass from the assertion that what- ever is either is or is not to the conclusion that, if this is denied, quantitative and numerical propositions become unmeaning, ovS' OTTOO-OV rt Set TO p.rj oXov eti/ai, K.r.X. ? What has Excluded Middle to do in particular with number? (b) Next Mr. Benn goes on to argue against the proposition that all existence is perfect, a pro- position which may no doubt be interpreted in a sense which makes it a manifest absurdity. But what Mr. Benn has to show, if his original statement is to be justified, is not that some existence is imperfect, but that all existence is necessarily (for Plato, that is) imperfect, and this is just what he does not attempt to prove. 1 At the same time, I confess that my own formulation of my objec- tion to his theory was obscurely expressed. What I meant to hint at, and ought to have made clear, is the essentially erroneous character of the attempted identification of the Platonic concept of yeveo-is with Descartes' ' existence '. The difference of mean- ing between the two is so wide that whether you affirm or deny that Plato agrees with Descartes that perfection implies existence, your statement is in either case inevitably bound to be more or less unintelligible. (4) My most serious criticism however is dismissed by Mr. Benn in a fashion which might fairly be said to amount to a tacit admis- sion of its reasonableness. I still say that if Mr. Benn is serious in maintaining the elimination of the transcendent Idea from the later Platonism, he is bound to show how his version of Plato can be harmonised with the emphatic declarations of Timceus 51 b-52 a. This task Mr. Benn up till now declines to execute, and offers no reply to the request for its execution beyond a perfunctory reference to the difficult passage (ibid., 35 A) about the construction of the World- Soul out of the Same and the Other. Now I maintain that whatever the real meaning of this famous crux may be, it is a first principle of rational exegesis that we should proceed from the straightforward and unambiguous language of such passages as 51-52, and not from the most difficult and most ambiguous passage in the whole Timceus, as a basis for our interpretation of the dialogue. Indeed it is not even to be assumed without proof that reference to the passages about the composition of Soul is relevant in a dis- cussion of the statements about the problem of the being of Ideas and their relation to sensible existence. But I must reserve further discussion of the meaning of the passage Timceus 35 A for a more suitable opportunity. Meanwhile I will only say that Mr. Benn is hardly entitled to assume that it is impossible that I should hold Dr. Jackson or Mr. Archer-Hind capable of making a mistake. Contrast Timasus 92 B. /ze'yto-roy KOL apivros KaXXiorroy re KOI reXecbra- TOS