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556 NEW BOOKS. seem the unwarranted assumptions, the gaps and the incoherencies of Mr. Spencer's system. A. W. BBNN. La, Morale di T. Hobbes. Da BODOLFO MONDOLFO. Verona, 1903. Pp. 278. The object of this work the first of a projected series of essays on the history of utilitarian morality is to exhibit an alleged fundamental con- tradiction hi the teaching of Hobbes which, according to the author, has escaped the notice of previous critics. After setting up as the greatest good the continual excitement and satisfaction of fresh desires, Hobbes in his political philosophy substitutes for this the mere preservation of life as such, to be secured by the establishment of an absolute government which, while maintaining order, leaves no room for the expansion of human individuality. More than this, the author of the Leviathan by placing the life no less than the property of every citizen at the absolute disposal of the supreme ruler takes away even that guarantee of bare existence for which the sacrifice of individual liberty was originally -demanded. Thus Hobbes's system results in the complete negation of its own premisses. It seems to me that Signer Mondolfo has failed to make out his case, And that Hobbes, whatever his inconsistencies in other respects, is in this instance perfectly logical. That absolutism whose cause he pleaded while denying to the private citizen all right of interfering with or criticising the government, as well as of course of making war on other citizens, leaves unhindered scope to the gratification of all his harmless desires. And Hobbes has explained this with his usual clearness in chap, xiii., sect. 15, of the De Give, a passage which his critic must have read as he quotes a simile from it (p. 265), although in such a manner as totally to pervert the meaning of the original. While on the subject of references I may mention that the author sends us twice over (pp. 79 and 255) to Spinoza, Eth. iii., prop. 15, when apparently he means prop. 27 ; that on this occasion he makes Spinoza talk about sympathy and imitation when the two are identified in the original, sympathy being called the imitation of feeling ; and that, finally, there is not the slightest evidence of Spinoza's having derived his ideas on sympathy from Malebranche, as is here too hastily assumed. A. W. BENN. KECEITED also : Marvin, An Introduction to Philosophy, Columbia University Press, 1903, pp. ix, 572. Burnet, Aristotle on Education, Cambridge University Press, 1903, pp. 141. Stratton, Experimental Psychology and Culture, Macmillan & Co., 1903, pp. vi, 331. Oarus, Fundamental Problems, Chicago, Open Court Publishing Co., 1903, pp. xii, 373. Wyld, Notes of My Life, Kegan Paul, Trench, 1903, pp. vii, 124. Carus, The Surd of Metaphysics, Chicago, Open Court Publishing Co., 1903, pp. 233. Curnont, The Mysteries of Mithra, Chicago, Open Court Publishing Co. ; London, K. Paul, Trench, Triibner & Co., 1903, pp. x, 228.